

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 17800

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ISSN: 2365-9793

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ABSTRACT

Planning for Family Succession*

Sons succeed their exiting CEO parents more often than daughters. How do entrepreneurial families reach this gender imbalance, and how does it affect the prospects of their firms and their offspring? Using Finnish administrative data on firms linked to population register data on shareholders and their extended families, we trace the steps leading to the succession decision, and its outcomes. We examine fertility patterns, finding evidence of son preference in natural births and adoptions by entrepreneurs. In families that appear to follow son-biased fertility stopping rules, we also find noticeable differences in human capital accumulation between sons and daughters. The transmission of human capital is also mediated by the extent to which women are employed in the industry of the entrepreneur parent. Gaps in income, board membership, and share ownership between sons and daughters of exiting CEOs emerge well before succession. Turning to firm outcomes, we find evidence that other family members, but not the children of exiting CEOs, appear to diminish firm performance relative to the results of professional CEOs. Overall, our results show family succession is a protracted process that begins with the birth of the first child.

JEL Classification: G32, L25, J13, J24

Keywords: family firms, son preference, CEO transition, gender differences, human capital

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* We are grateful for research funding support from the Yrjö Uitto, Yrjö Jahnsson and HSE support foundations. We thank participants at the Nordic Summer Institute in Labor Economics 2024, EALE 2024, Stanford SITE 2024, Barcelona BSE 2024, Cornell-Dordona conference 2024, Finnish Economic Association 2024 conference, Leuven Summer Event 2023, Nordic Initiative for Corporate Economics 2023 Conference, University of Vienna Applied Economics seminar, University of Turku and VATT Institute for their comments and suggestions. We also thank Oskari Ijäs for excellent research assistance.

1 Introduction

It is well known that few women are employed as top managers in corporations.¹ This is also true of family businesses, which are far more likely to be run by men rather than women. Likewise, daughters of entrepreneurs are less likely to become CEO successors than their brothers (Pérez-González (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Tsoutsoura (2015), Kustec et al. (2025)). How do entrepreneurial families reach the decision to perpetuate this gender imbalance? How do their decisions affect the prospects of their children and their firms? Family businesses play a prominent role in the economy generating about 70% of world GDP (UNCTAD (2021)). With rising female labor force participation and declining fertility, answering these questions about succession and the consequences for those born into family run businesses is a pressing policy concern.

Lacking a successor from within the family, these firms may be liquidated or sold under duress.² If business owners do not anticipate a family succession, they may also reduce their investment in their firm.³ Declining fertility reduces the potential for family-run firms to produce any heir. More generally, declining fertility rates reduce the choice set for determining which sibling will assume responsibility for the firm, and hence diminishes the firm's profitability outlook. This exacerbates concerns that appointing a family member, rather than a professional CEO, may hurt firm performance, and in particular affect minority (non-family) shareholders.

This paper empirically examines how entrepreneurial families prepare for business succession. We analyze entrepreneurs' fertility patterns, their children's human capital investments, the succession decision itself, and the resulting outcomes for both the firm and the offspring—before and after succession. Our analysis draws on rich linkages in Finnish administrative data that track the lives of entrepreneurs, their children, and their businesses.

We observe the entire population of Finland in administrative register data, and we match individuals to

¹Only about 7% of Finnish firms and 8% of S&P 500 companies had a female CEO in 2023, according to the Finnish Chamber of Commerce (Keskuskauppakamari, Naiset pörssiyritysten johdossa - kansainvälinen vertailu, March 2023) and catalyst.org (Women CEOs of the S&P 500 (2023, February 3))

²For example, the European Investment Fund sponsors funding for businesses that would cease to operate or would be sold piecemeal or under duress, when there are no family successors willing to take over the business.

³Kodama et al. (2021) find that among Japanese family firms, the presence of a potential family successor leads to firm growth and investments in IT and operational efficiency. Cao et al. (2015) find that under the constraints of the one child policy in China, having fewer children negatively affects founder's expectation to go public, reduces family firm's reinvestment rate and R&D.

their (extended) families, the firms they own and/or work for, and their periods of education and training. We track shareholder data and CEO exits in all Finnish corporations. We draw upon several non-overlapping sub-samples: CEOs of family owned corporations, CEOs of corporations that are not family owned, individuals registered as self-employed at some point during their working lives, and individuals who are always classified as employees (as opposed to self-employed). We also follow a sample of individuals recorded as self-employed at age 57 through their retirement. Across these subsamples, we compare fertility patterns and the human capital accumulation of their children. For entrepreneurs and CEOs, we additionally compare their firm outcomes pre- and post-succession, as well as the outcomes of their children following CEO exits or the entrepreneur parent’s retirement.

We emphasize two distinct channels of influence on the process of succession. First, we observe entrepreneurs’ fertility stopping patterns indicative of son bias ([Bharadwaj et al. \(2014\)](#), [Dossi et al. \(2021\)](#)). We then track how human capital accumulation and succession decisions differ between families exhibiting son-biased fertility patterns and other families. Second, we observe the modal industry in which entrepreneurs operate throughout their lives, and classify it as female(male) dominated based on whether women(men) represent more than 50% of the workforce. As described below, the fertility, offspring human capital accumulation and succession patterns of entrepreneurs are strongly aligned with the gender balance of the industry in which they operate.

To understand, statistically, why sons are overrepresented in the pool of successors, we begin by examining the fertility patterns of entrepreneurs. A large literature in demography and economics has documented contexts where families with a firstborn daughter tend to be larger. This pattern has been observed in both developing and developed country contexts, and we briefly summarize this literature in Section 2. We document this pattern in Finland: for individuals classified as never having been self-employed (always employees), having a firstborn daughter raises the overall number of children by 1.25%. Among the self-employed, the effect reaches 2.55%, and is highest for entrepreneur parents in male dominated industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining and construction.⁴ In Section 2.1, we discuss several interpretations for this empirical regularity: it may reflect pure preferences for one gender over the other or a perceived lower cost of raising sons conditional on the father’s occupation. The higher magnitudes we find for entrepreneurial

⁴As a benchmark for these magnitudes, using U.S. census data, [Dahl and Moretti \(2008\)](#) find an increase of 0.3% in the total number of children in families with a firstborn daughter. They find particularly high effects for Asian mothers, 2.1%, but statistically insignificant effects for college-educated mothers.

families relative to employees may also reflect early calculations about the desired gender of the heir meant to take over the family business. We observe the same gender imbalances in a sample of adopted children. Entrepreneurs in male-dominated industries are less likely to adopt daughters. Interestingly, female CEOs are significantly more likely to adopt girls than boys.

Next, we document how the children of entrepreneurs accumulate human capital and work experience, and compare their pathways to those of children of employees. Overall, daughters are much less likely than sons to pursue the same field of study as the entrepreneur father, their first episode of formal employment occurs later than their brothers', they accumulate fewer years of work experience in the parent's industry, and are less likely to work in the same firm as their father. These patterns are reversed if their mother is a CEO or self-employed, but the magnitude of the effects is smaller and often statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with findings in the literature on intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurship, reviewed in Section 2. Our contribution illuminates the importance of gender predominance in the industry of the parent CEO in mediating the same-gender transmission of human capital. Thus, daughters are more likely to study in the same field as their fathers, and also work with their fathers, if the family firm operates in a female-dominated industry. We also find that daughters of entrepreneurs in families displaying son-biased fertility stopping rules get less experience working with their parents, especially in male-dominated industries.

At succession, daughters of Finnish entrepreneurs are less likely than sons to assume the CEO role,⁵ unless their mother is a CEO working in an industry where a majority of employees are also female. Over the period of our analysis, the fraction of successions in favor of daughters increases only slightly, driven mainly by a volatile upward trend in female-dominated industries (Figure 1). We also examine succession in smaller firms without an explicit board and CEO position, and similarly find that daughters are less likely to be linked (employed) to the firm of their retiring self-employed parent. One novel finding is that the magnitude of the daughter penalty in the likelihood of succession is larger in families that exhibit son-biased fertility stopping rules. We also document that gaps between daughters and sons in stock ownership and board membership are established well before succession takes place, and are also aligned with the gender predominance in the entrepreneur parent's industry.

⁵This pattern has been documented in the U.S. by Pérez-González (2006), in Denmark by Bennedsen et al. (2007), in Greece by Tsoutsoura (2015) and in Norway by Kustec et al. (2025).

To analyze the effect of successions on firm outcomes, we begin by documenting the circumstances of CEO exits. Succession often has a legacy aspect: children are more likely to take over the firm when the CEO retires or dies, but when the CEO exits earlier, other family members or unrelated, professional CEOs are more likely to take over. In section 2.4, we review the literature documenting the effect of appointing a family, as opposed to an unrelated CEO on firm outcomes. We benchmark our results to this literature by employing difference-in-differences and instrumental variable models to compare the performance of firms managed by professional versus family CEOs. We do not find a systematic pattern of under-performance if the incoming CEO is the child of the exiting CEO, either in family-owned and non-family owned firms. However, our results point to systematic under-performance in cases where family members other than children are appointed. In smaller firms without explicit boards or CEOs, we additionally show that successions in favor of a family member are associated with positive effects on turnover, assets, and number of employees. In smaller firms, involving family members is arguably more important for stimulating firm continuity and growth.

Our paper also provides new insights into how the children of retiring CEOs and entrepreneurs are affected by the succession decision. Four years before succession, the total earnings of daughters of family business CEOs are 27 per cent lower than those of their brothers, an earnings gap larger than the gap in the overall Finnish economy, which stood at 16 per cent in 2020.⁶ After the succession decision, male heirs who become CEOs do not experience significant earnings gains, consistent with previous evidence that they are already in top-earning roles. In contrast, daughters promoted to CEO experience a 15 percent increase in earnings. On net, because the share of daughters taking over the CEO role is small, the overall effect is that successions increase the gender earnings gap between the daughters and sons of CEOs.

The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows. We review the related work and explain how our analysis fits into the literature in Section 2. Section 3 explains how our sample was assembled. We summarize the empirical strategy in Sections 4 and explain our empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

⁶Gender Pay Gap, Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, <https://stm.fi/en/gender-equality/equal-pay>

2 Related Literature

Our work is related to four strands of literature that examine gender-biased fertility preferences and adoption patterns, (same-gender) intergenerational transmission of human capital, the role of women in the management of family firms, and the outcomes of family firms which undergo a generational transition. This section briefly reviews each component and explains our contribution to it.

2.1 Son preference

Fertility patterns reveal parental preferences over the gender of children. These preferences might be based on idiosyncratic, cultural or economic factors. In many developing countries boys are preferred as they may ensure the continuity of the family farm. These revealed preferences skew gender ratios at birth, and are associated with different human capital investments depending on the gender of the child ([Bharadwaj et al. \(2014\)](#), [Jayachandran and Kuziemko \(2011\)](#)). This pattern has been called *son preference*, and has also been documented in developed economies.⁷ [Dahl and Moretti \(2008\)](#) analyze parent preferences over the gender of children in the United States. They find that among couples in first marriages with at least one child, the relative risk of having another child is 1.007 (0.3% higher probability) for couples with a firstborn daughter, relative to those with a firstborn son. [Lundberg \(2005\)](#) points out that these empirical results may reflect different perceived productivity of parenting same gender children, or differences in the costs of raising boys versus girls (for example education costs, given women are more likely to attend college). [Blau et al. \(2020\)](#) revisits the extent son preference prevails in the U.S. and find a reversal of son preference for natives, which they argue may be due to increased intra-family female bargaining power or increased cost concerns about raising girls.

[Andersson et al. \(2006\)](#) examine son preference patterns in Nordic countries, and find, for second-birth risks, statistically insignificant effects in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, with positive and statistically significant effects for son preference in Finland. The authors conjecture that the late industrialization and urbanization in Finland is associated with lingering cultural norms that attach a higher value to sons as heirs. The relative risk of 0.98 they find for Finland translates into a 2% probability relative to families with firstborn boys. [Saarela and Finnäs \(2014\)](#) also find evidence of son preference in Finland, but show it has

⁷Parents may also have preferences for gender parity, see for example [Angrist and Evans \(1998\)](#).

been gradually weakening since 1970 and has reached small magnitudes for children born in the 1990s.

Our investigations show entrepreneurial families in Finland exhibit a greater degree of son preference than other families. Using US Census data, [Broussard et al. \(2015\)](#) document son preference for self-employed married men, in a sample of families with co-resident children. They find self-employed families display a higher probability of having a third child conditional on the first two children being girls. Compared to their sample, we document this pattern for men and women of any marital status and family size. Importantly, and new to the literature in this field, we show that this behavior is connected to the gender balance in the entrepreneur parent's industry, and we link son biased fertility stopping behaviors to the human capital accumulation and succession stages in the lives of entrepreneurial families.

Our paper also contributes to the literature investigating preferences for the gender of adopted children. In the U.S., [Baccara et al. \(2014\)](#) find adoptive parents are more likely to adopt girls and less likely to adopt African American children. [Larsen Gibby and Thomas \(2019\)](#) find the gender of adopted children is consistent with parental preferences for balanced sex composition among their children. Our paper documents the adoption practices of Finnish entrepreneurs and CEOs. We find their revealed preferences are aligned with the modal gender in the entrepreneur parent's industry, and in this way are somewhat reminiscent of the Japanese practice of CEOs adopting promising (male) adults as principal heirs ([Mehrotra et al. \(2013\)](#)).

2.2 Intergenerational associations

A large body of work documents how children follow in their parent's footsteps, through intergenerational correlations in occupation, field of study, and employers ([Corak and Piraino \(2011\)](#)). Entrepreneurs and their children are no exception, and intergenerational correlations in entrepreneurship are very high. [Lindquist et al. \(2015\)](#) review results in this literature and find that having an entrepreneur parent raises the probability of the child becoming an entrepreneur by between 30% and 200%.

An important question in this literature is whether the transmission of entrepreneurship is dictated by nature, nurture or inherited wealth. Comparing biological children to adoptees, [Lindquist et al. \(2015\)](#) find that role model effects dominate the estimated effects of greater access to capital enjoyed by the children of entrepreneurial parents, or the effect of genetics alone. [Dunn and Holtz-Eakin \(2000\)](#), [Lindquist et al. \(2015\)](#), [Hoffmann et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Vladasel et al. \(2021\)](#) document patterns of same-gender occupational transmission of entrepreneurship.

Our insights into how son-biased fertility stopping rules are correlated with human capital and succession decisions are related to analyses of how the presence of a younger brother affects the intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurship (Mishkin (2021)), choice of STEM major in college (Oguzoglu and Ozbeklik (2016)) or patenting (Hoisl et al. (2023)). Mishkin (2021) finds the transmission of self-employment from father to daughters decreases when firstborn daughters have younger brothers, but not younger sisters. The gender-biased nature of the intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurship is a mechanism that perpetuates gendered differences in self-employment, which have otherwise been explained by differences in risk aversion (Le Maire and Schjerning (2007)) or competitiveness (Bönte and Piegeler (2013)).

We investigate the education and work experience choices of children of entrepreneurs. We show that the same-gender transmission of human capital is mediated by the gender balance of the entrepreneur parent's industry and the shareholder structure of the firm. We integrate this literature with research on son preference, by showing how patterns of human capital accumulation and succession decisions differ in families that exhibit son biased fertility stopping rules versus those that don't.

2.3 Women's role in the management of family firms

A growing literature in management, summarized in Jimenez (2009), Wang (2010) and Maseda et al. (2022), explicitly explores women's role in family firms and the gendered nature of the succession process. This literature sheds light on the dynamics behind the disproportionately low fraction of daughters taking over family firms. In some firms, the succession process is automatically dictated by primogeniture, leaving little room for choice among potential successors (Hollander and Bukowitz (1990), Keating and Little (1997)). When daughters are potential successors, they face significant biases (Galiano and Vinturella (1995)). For example Byrne et al. (2019) document several mechanisms perpetuating masculine successor roles, for example framing entrepreneurial traits as inherently male and linking desirable successor traits with male family members.

While women may face discrimination in general in the corporate world, additional conflicts arise in family businesses as daughters navigate family and business roles when becoming candidates for succession (Dumas (1992), Vera and Dean (2005)). While role conflict applies to sons of family business owners as well, in the case of daughters, this conflict is amplified by what may be perceived as gender atypical roles which challenge typical family relations, for example between mothers and daughters.

Several authors point out that daughters are ‘untapped resources’ whose education and work experience is underutilized in the family firm, compared to sons (Dumas (1992), Lyman et al. (1985), Martin (2001)). Ahrens et al. (2015) find, analyzing a sample of German firms, that daughters are passed over for succession despite being more educated and experienced. We similarly find that daughters of Finnish CEOs and entrepreneurs are more educated and have more experience outside the family firm. They however hold less experience in the family firm, which turns out to be an important factor in the succession process. Salgani-coff (1990), Handler (1994) and Curimbaba (2002) point out that daughters receive less training specific to the family firm, in contrast to their brothers, who receive training targeted to the family firm, which in turn legitimizes their role as potential successors.

Lyman (1989), Rowe and Hong (2000) and Danes and Olson (2003) point out that when daughters (or wives) do participate in the family business, their roles are often undefined, informal and/or unpaid, which results in lower earnings relative to male family members. Danes and Olson (2003) study 391 family-business-owning couples and report that 57 percent of wives worked in the family business, but only 47 percent were paid. Dumas (1998) similarly points out that women who are actively working in family firms do not have substantial stock ownership positions. Our findings are consistent with these observations, as we document significant gender gaps between daughters and sons in the probability of being employed by the entrepreneur parent’s firm, owning any shares, or being a board member.

2.4 Family or professional CEOs

Many firms, including corporations with a wide shareholder base, are controlled by family owners.⁸ Several authors have suggested that choosing a successor to lead the firm from within the family because of say birthright or gender, rather than from professionals competing for the job based on their leadership skills, could reduce the firm’s profitability. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) conjecture that primogeniture rules may cause a moral hazard problem: the designated male heir invests less in human capital than he would if his future as head was not guaranteed. Several authors have empirically investigated whether a leadership transition arising from a succession that installs a family member, rather than a professional CEO from outside the family, leads to better or worse firm outcomes. Findings by Pérez-González (2006), Villalonga

⁸Across Europe, the Austrian Institute for SME Research (2008) documented that 70%-80% of enterprises are family businesses and they account for 40%-50% of employment. In the U.S., Anderson and Reeb (2003) documented that 35% of S&P 500 firms were family owned.

and Amit (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Tsoutsoura (2015) and Kustec et al. (2025) point to negative effects from appointing a family CEO on firm activity, including revenue, assets and profitability. Using Norwegian data, Kustec et al. (2025) find that the negative effects are largely coming from families where the son successor never had any work experience outside the family firm, while Bach (2016) does not find negative effects on firm performance from appointing a family CEO in Sweden.

The decision to seek a successor outside the family might be influenced by many unobserved variables related to the motivation and ability of potential heirs. As such unobservables will bias ordinary least square estimates, authors in this literature have sought instrumental variables likely to affect firm outcomes solely by influencing whether a professional CEO or a family member are recruited at the transition stage. Pérez-González (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007) and Bach (2016) use the gender of the firstborn child, or the fraction of female children of the retiring CEO as instrumental variables. Daughters are considerably less likely than their brothers to be selected for succession, and the gender of the firstborn child is (arguably) random, suggesting the instrument is likely to meet the relevance and exogeneity conditions.

Our evidence of son preference among entrepreneurial families, and the differences in human capital investment in families that exhibit son-biased fertility preferences, indicate that the gender of the firstborn child or the gender composition of children are likely to influence family size and the human capital accumulation of potential successors.

Compared to previous empirical work, we also use shareholder data to distinguish family owned firms from non-family owned firms. We also extend the analysis of the effect of family versus professional successions to smaller firms that do not have a board or CEO. These distinctions are qualitatively and quantitatively important; for example family successions are positively correlated with the performance of smaller firms, whereas results are more mixed for larger firms. Our analysis also extends previous work by explicitly tracing the gender imbalanced succession decision to earlier choices that entrepreneurial families make about fertility and the human capital accumulation of their children.

More broadly, our paper contributes to the literature examining the outcomes and governance of family firms. Several authors have taken a structural approach to modeling the decisions of family firm owners. Using data on US traded firms, Hamilton et al. (2023) estimate a dynamic model of CEO turnover where candidates for succession can come from both inside and outside the family. They find prohibiting family hires would decrease firm profits. Their results support the notion that firms derive some benefits from

family successions. One of the mechanisms they point out is that family members almost mechanically provide additional sources of talent in markets with thin access to professional talent. In turn, the availability of insider candidates puts upward pressure on the hiring threshold for outsider CEOs. They argue these indirect benefits at the recruitment stage can explain the positive effects they find, in contrast to findings by [Lippi and Schivardi \(2014\)](#), who find hiring CEOs who have personal relationships with firm personnel hurts firm performance.

3 Data and Summary Statistics

Our study is based on Finnish administrative records for the years 1987 through 2019, covering the entire population of approximately 5.5 million inhabitants. These data contain information on employment status at the end of the year, highest level of education, field of study, and background demographic characteristics. The self-employed⁹ were divided into three groups. First, we counted the number of years these individuals appear recorded as self-employed in the Finnish register data.¹⁰ Then we created terciles based on the duration of self-employment relative to total observed labor market experience. This partition roughly distinguishes individuals who were occasionally self-employed from individuals who are recorded as entrepreneurs most of their lives. We also identified individuals who are never recorded as self-employed as an additional group of (always) employees. 82% of the sample are always employees, while 18% are recorded at some point as self-employed. In empirical analyses we treat the CEOs as separate categories, regardless of whether they were recorded as self-employed or employees in the administrative data. This partition yields six mutually exclusive categories: CEOs exiting a firm owned by their family, CEOs exiting firms not owned by their family, self-employed individuals grouped by the duration of their self-employment spell, and individuals who are always recorded as employees. Among the self-employed we additionally examine a sample of individuals recorded as such at age 57, whom we track into their retirement.

CEO entry and exits are identified from the administrative data which contains information about board positions for every limited liability company in Finland between 1994 and 2019. We also determined

⁹In the overall population, self-employment accounted for 14% of employment in Finland compared to 7% in the U.S. and 14% in the EU-27, according to the recent OECD data and definitions. Source: OECD (2024), Self-employment rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/fb58715e-en.

¹⁰Our data spans 33 years, but it is truncated for individuals who had entered the labor market before 1987. As such, we may be misclassifying older individuals who had short spells of self-employment before 1987.

whether the exiting CEO was part of the family that owned a majority of shares in the firm. For this purpose, we used share ownership data, available since 2006.¹¹ To determine whether businesses are family owned, we first determined family structures: for each individual, we identified, through linkages in administrative data, his or her children, parents, spouse and cohabitants. Combining information on parent-child and spouse linkages, we also identify all siblings and children in law for each individual. Then, for each exiting CEO, we determined whether their family (defined as parents, children, spouses, siblings, and children-in-law) collectively owned 50% or more of the firm.¹² Table A1 displays summary statistics on the turnover (revenue), assets, and number of employees of the firms which experience a succession, four years before the succession year. The average family-owned business has 9.8 employees, 1.7 million euros in assets, and 2 million euros in revenue, while firms classified as not family owned have 68.6 employees on average, 33.9 million euros in assets and 26.3 million euros in revenue.

Table 1 shows summary statistics for each CEO's last observed exit in the data, by the age of the exiting CEO.¹³ In family-owned firms, 55.9% of exiting CEOs are replaced by a family member.¹⁴

Among firms where the family of the CEO does not own a majority of the shares, 15.6% of exiting CEOs are succeeded by a family member. In the broader sample of firms (including those for which ownerships structure is unknown), 27.1% of CEO successions are in favor of a family member.¹⁵ The share of successions in favor of a family member naturally increases with age for all CEOs, as a higher share of new CEOs is recruited from the exiting CEO's children. For example, among CEOs over 70 in family owned firms, 63% of successions favor the CEO's children, with 50% favoring sons and 13% favoring daughters.

In order to study successions in smaller firms that do not have a board structure or a CEO, we created a subsample of individuals recorded as self-employed at age 57 and track their yearly employment status until

¹¹Limited-liability companies must provide information about their shareholders if there are no more than 10 shareholders. If there are more shareholders, the limited liability company must report the personal information of the shareholders who own at least 10% of the company's stock, as well as all shareholders who have received a shareholder loan.

¹²We opt for this simple and transparent definition of family firms, although the literature operates with many definitions (see e.g. Villalonga and Amit (2020)), which acknowledge family control over firms results with even less than 50% of shares. Knüpfer (2024) provides a more detailed analysis of Finnish firm ownership data, which also tracks the ultimate natural person beneficiaries of Finnish legal-person shareholders.

¹³In Table A2 we show very similar patterns of gender differences between successor sons and daughters for all observed CEO exits.

¹⁴For comparison, Kustec et al. (2025) found 64 percent of CEO successions in family firms in Norway are in favor of a family member.

¹⁵This proportion is comparable to the 33% found by Bennedsen et al. (2007) in Denmark. In the sample of US traded corporations, Pérez-González (2006) found 36.4 of successions involved a family CEO.

age 68, when virtually all self-employed entrepreneurs retire.¹⁶ For CEOs explicitly identified in board data, the timing of their exit is precisely determined. For self-employed business owners, we define succession as the event that a parent previously working in year T at a firm no longer appears to be working in year $T+1$, but one of their children is working at the same firm in year $T+1$. For a majority of entrepreneurs observed self-employed at age 57, we also observe the legal status of the firm they are associated with. The majority of self-employed individuals are recorded as natural persons or sole proprietorships, with the remainder operating in limited liability companies or in partnerships. About 29.9% of limited liability companies and 22.3% of partnerships continue to be linked to a family member after the retirement of the entrepreneur, with about half being linked to a male heir of the retiring entrepreneur. Many sole proprietorships operate in the name of the self-employed person, but some operate under a registered trading name and can be passed on. The linkage rate to a family member is much lower, but the same gender imbalanced patterns apply: male heirs are much more likely to take over the activity.

Table 2 summarizes characteristics of exiting and incoming CEOs in family firms. There are fundamental differences between the circumstances under which a professional CEO, a child, or another family member take over. Children in particular are much more likely than professional CEOs to take over upon the retirement or death of the exiting CEO. In turn, they usually take over at younger ages than professional CEOs. The average age of a son or daughter successors is 33.4 and 34.9 respectively, while the average age of a professional CEOs taking over is 41.3. Furthermore, situations where family members other than children (spouses, siblings, parents, children-in-law) take over display different patterns than successions in favor of children. For example, the average age of the exiting CEO is 45.5 for other family member successions, whereas it is 62 and 63 for sons and daughters, respectively. These successions are also less likely to follow the retirement of the exiting CEO. This suggests that successions in favor of children may be more planned, or ‘legacy’ successions, compared to successions in favor of other family members.

Turning to differences in human capital, professional CEOs tend to be more educated than son CEOs, but the difference is not statistically significant from daughter CEOs or other family members. Family

¹⁶Figure A1 shows the yearly status of these individuals, indicating whether they are still alive, retired, employed in the same firm they worked for at age 57, employed in a different firm, out of the labor force or out of the sample (potentially because of out migration). By age 68, virtually all self-employed retire or pass away. The high rates of retirement around age 62-63 are influenced by the Finnish system of entrepreneurs’ pensions, mandatory for individuals who register as self-employed longer than six months. This system creates incentives for entrepreneurs to draw their pensions past a certain age. Patterns are very similar for men and women, except for lower mortality rates for women.

successors have more experience in the firm than professional CEOs. Son CEO successors are more likely than daughter CEO successors to have any previous experience in the firm. Being older, professional CEOs have more managerial experience and experience outside the family firm. Among child successors, 19% of sons and 11% of daughters have no experience outside the family firm.

Patterns for non-family owned firms, shown in Table A3, are very similar. One exception is the fact that the education of professional CEOs relative to family CEOs is higher across the board, whereas in family firms differences in formal education are smaller, and not statistically significant when comparing professional CEOs and daughters who become CEOs, for example.

We examined how the gender of the children of CEOs and entrepreneurs affects overall family size, the succession decision and the growth of the firm. Table 3 displays summary statistics on the fertility patterns and family composition of individuals aged 57 and above. Entrepreneurs and CEOs are overall more likely to have larger families, and less likely to be childless. We also show gender ratios for families by the number of children. For individuals with exactly one child, the overall ratio of boys to girls is higher among entrepreneurs and particularly high for CEOs in family businesses. This pattern is consistent, as we will show, with entrepreneurs and CEOs displaying son-biased fertility stopping patterns which make them more likely to stop having children after having a male heir. As such, having just one daughter may be a less desirable outcome for these individuals, and they end up having more children. Likewise, one male child is likely a desirable outcome, and the ratio between sons and daughters ends up being particularly high. Similar patterns can be observed for entrepreneurs who have two or three children: having two or three boys is a more common outcome than having two or three girls. In families with two children, it is also more common to observe among entrepreneurs (relative to employees) that the last child is a boy. This can be interpreted as a fertility stopping rule associated with son bias (Bharadwaj et al. (2014), Dossi et al. (2021)). This type of fertility stopping rule is evident in families with more than two children. The probability that the last son is a boy is higher in entrepreneurial families and for CEOs of family owned businesses.

We also document the human capital accumulation process of the children of exiting CEOs and retiring entrepreneurs, and compare it to that of employees. For these purposes, we used the education information in the Finnish administrative records, for example yearly data on highest educational attainment and field of study for the highest attained degree. We also construct yearly work experience histories for the children of entrepreneurs and employees. We measure overall years of work experience, years of experience in the firm

from which the parent entrepreneur/CEO retires/exits, and whether the child ever worked in the same firm as the parent entrepreneur.

The outcome variables for the firms from which CEOs exit/ entrepreneurs retire are obtained from the FIRM_FSS Financial Statement Data panel, which contains balance sheet information on revenue (turnover), assets, number of employees and the overall wage bill, among other items. We also use a measure of firm profitability, the Operating Return on Assets (OROA), defined as the ratio of (adjusted operating profits- depreciation) and assets. We also use an industry adjusted OROA measure, subtracting from the firm OROA the average OROA for the 2-digit industry in which it operates.

4 Empirical Methods

In the steps outlined below, we use linear probability models to examine fertility, human capital accumulation and succession decisions within families, comparing daughters to sons, as well as across families, comparing households with just daughters or just sons. In examining firm and child outcomes around the time of succession, we employ difference in differences specifications, comparing firms with family successor CEOs to those where an unrelated CEO takes over. We also compare the earnings outcomes of children of CEOs who are appointed as successors to those who are not.

We examine how fertility, human capital accumulation and succession decisions are influenced by the gender composition in the parent’s industry. We use the modal industry of employment over the parent’s employment history and calculate fraction female employment based on register data for all employees in the respective industry.¹⁷ We then define male(female) dominated industries as those in which more(less) than 50% of the employees in the industry are male.

We also link the fertility stage to later human capital accumulation and succession stages by identifying families that exhibit son-biased fertility stopping patterns (Bharadwaj et al. (2014), Dossi et al. (2021)). Such families exhibit a pattern of having $n \geq 2$ children, where the first $n-1$ children are girls and the last is a boy. We focus on a subsample of individuals aged 52 and above, whose fertility spells are likely to

¹⁷We calculate this measure at the two-digit industry level. In practice, as our time horizon spans several changing industrial classifications, we use a harmonization crosswalk prepared by Joonas Tuhkuri, <https://joonastuhkuri.com/>. For fertility and human capital accumulation outcomes, we show results separately by the modal industry over the parent’s career, while for succession outcomes we use the industry in which the firm operates. Results are very similar when using the industry in which the parent works at ages 30 or 40 (closer to the typical family formation stage).

be completed.¹⁸ We create an indicator for son-biased families and in subsequent analyses compare the magnitudes of effects for families who exhibit this fertility pattern and those who do not.

4.1 Pre-succession outcomes

A linear probability model was used to examine the impact of the gender of the firstborn on the total number of children. Let Y_i denote the total number of children for parent i .¹⁹ Let FBD_i indicate whether the firstborn child is a daughter, and X_i include controls for parental age, gender, income, place of residence, and education. Writing:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta FBD_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

we assume ε_i is orthogonal to the regressors and estimate the model using least squares (OLS). This specification is estimated separately for (always) employees, self-employed individuals, CEOs in family-owned businesses and CEOs in firms without family majority ownership. We also estimate this specification separately for male and female entrepreneurs working in male and female-dominated industries, as well as separately by industry.

Turning to human capital accumulation, we show how the educational and early employment decisions of daughters of entrepreneurs differ from those of sons. Here Y_i denotes a series of educational and employment outcomes of children: whether the child's field of study is the same as the parent's, the age at which the child is first employed, the number of years of schooling accumulated by age 30, years of cumulative work experience in the parent's industry, and an indicator for whether the child ever worked in the same firm as the parent:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta Daughter_i + \delta ParentFE_i + \gamma Childage_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

The explanatory variables in these regressions are $Daughter_i$, an indicator variable for the gender of the child, with coefficient β capturing differences in the outcomes between brothers and sisters, and $Childage_i$,

¹⁸For the purposes of our analyses below on human capital accumulation and firm succession, we compare children aged 18 and above. As such, even though some individuals continue to grow their families past the age of 52, by the time children born after age 52 turn 18, the vast majority of CEO successions and entrepreneur retirement have already occurred (see Table A2).

¹⁹We analyze fertility decisions at the individual (parent) level, as opposed to at the married couple level, as divorce and cohabitation (without marriage) rates are high. Individuals can also achieve their desired family composition by having children with several partners.

a sequence of indicator variables that control for the child's age. We also include a parent fixed effect, denoted by $ParentFE_i$, effectively comparing the outcomes of brothers and sisters. We also estimate equation 2 without parent fixed effects, for the subsample of families that have only daughters or only sons.

To capture differences between daughters and sons in son-biased families, we estimate a separate specification in which we add an interaction $Daughter_i * SonBias_i$ (with the parent fixed effect capturing the $SonBias$ main effect):

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Daughter_i + \beta_2 Daughter_i \times SonBias_i + \gamma Childage_i + \delta ParentFE_i + \varepsilon_i. \quad (3)$$

We use the same models in equations 2 and 3 above to study how the outcomes differ across children's gender at the succession stage. The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate daughters are considerably less likely than sons to take over as CEOs or to continue small family firms. Those results aggregate variation both between and within families. To further investigate these patterns, we conduct a within-family analysis, running the linear probability models in equation 2 above. The outcome Y_i is an indicator for whether the child takes over the firm, either becoming the new CEO after the parent CEO exits, or, in the case of smaller firms, whether the child is self-employed and linked to the same firm as the retiring parent. We also examine the likelihood of succession in families with only daughters or only sons, by estimating equation 2 without parent fixed effects. Lastly, we also apply specification 3 to analyze succession outcomes in son-biased families.

4.2 Post-succession outcomes

After the succession decision, we examine how the income of the exiting CEO's children has changed, using an augmented version of the specification in equation 2, which includes additional indicators variables for the highest level of education attained, and a quadratic in years of experience. Using this specification, we document to what extent earnings, stock ownership and board membership differ between the sons and daughters of entrepreneurs before the succession, and how these outcomes change after the CEO exit or parent's retirement. We also examine the impact of becoming a CEO for sons and daughter by employing a

descriptive²⁰ difference in difference specification:

$$\Delta Y_i = \alpha + \beta ChildCEO_i + \gamma Daughter_i + \mu ChildCEO_i \times Daughter_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (4)$$

where Y_i is total income, $ChildCEO_i$ is an indicator for whether a child was appointed CEO, further interacted with whether the daughter was appointed CEO. We add further controls X_i for children's highest educational attainment, a quadratic in the years of total experience accumulated by each of the CEO's children before the succession decision, and child age fixed effects.

To analyze changes in firm performance after succession we begin by using the difference-in-differences specification previously employed by Pérez-González (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007) or Bach (2016):

$$\Delta Y_i = \alpha + \beta FamilyCEO_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (5)$$

where ΔY_i indicates the difference between average firm outcomes three years after succession and three years before the succession year, and X_i includes fixed effects for the year of succession. To address the potential endogeneity of the decision to appoint a non-family CEO, the above-mentioned papers used, as an instrumental variable, the gender of the firstborn child or the ratio of male to total children. Excluding the instrument as a regressor in this difference in differences model is rationalized by assuming the gender of the firstborn has no impact on firm growth prospects aside from those associated with the appointment of a successor. For comparison purposes we also report instrumental variable results.

To investigate the assumption that the gender of the firstborn is uncorrelated with the disturbance in the equations characterizing firm outcomes, we check, in Table A4, whether having a firstborn daughter is associated with the size and activity of the firm, four years before succession. Evidence of a statistically significant effect would indicate firms may grow differently depending on the gender composition of the entrepreneur's family. We estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 FBD_i + \gamma Childage_i + \delta ParentFE_i + \eta X_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (6)$$

²⁰We do not expect the coefficients to provide the causal effect of becoming a CEO, as selection on unobserved ability will bias results. We are instead interested in the difference in magnitudes between daughters and sons.

where Y_i is a firm outcome (turnover, assets, number of employees, wages, and logs of these variables), FBD_i indicates the firstborn child is a daughter and X_i includes controls for the total number of children. Results shown in Table A4 indicate having a daughter as a firstborn is weakly negatively associated with the number of employees for entrepreneurs in firms without a board and CEO. These firms tend to be generally smaller in size, and it seems plausible that if sons are more likely to be involved in the family firm than daughters, the firm will grow in size, almost mechanically, given the additional son employee. This raises concerns about the exclusion restriction for small firms. For family-owned firms with a board (Panel B), as well as for non-family-owned firms, we do not find any statistically significant effects. This is an indication that the growth of these larger firms may be less impacted by whether entrepreneurs have a firstborn son that becomes involved in the family business.

5 Results

5.1 Fertility outcomes

Table 4 shows the effect of having a firstborn daughter on the overall number of children.²¹ Among individuals never recorded as self-employed (always employees), a firstborn daughter raises the overall number of children by 0.028, or 1.25%. The magnitude is slightly higher among terciles one and two of the self-employed, but considerably higher in tercile 3, standing at 0.056, or 2.49%, and in the sample of entrepreneurs at age 57, where the effect is 0.061, or 2.55% higher number of children. Among exiting CEOs, the magnitudes are higher than in the employee sample, and we find a statistically significant effect in the overall sample, with larger but imprecise estimates in the family CEO sample.

Columns 3-6 of Table 4 show results separately by the gender of the parent and by whether the modal industry they worked in was male or female dominated. The largest magnitudes for the firstborn daughter effect occur for fathers who are entrepreneurs in male dominated industries. Among female entrepreneurs, the magnitudes also tend to be larger in male-dominated industries. In female-dominated industries, magnitudes are smaller and effects are not statistically significant. Turning to results by industry, Table A5 compares

²¹Estimates in column 2 for ‘All’ are obtained from a sample where each parent is treated as an observation. As such, an individual may appear twice in the sample. We have estimated this specification using weights of 1/2 for individuals observed twice. Results are very similar (in magnitude as well as patterns of statistical significance) and are available from the authors.

magnitudes of the son-preference effect between employees and entrepreneurs, across one-digit industries. The effects are largest in agriculture and forestry, mining and construction, and manufacturing. Within these industries, effects are considerably larger and statistically significant for entrepreneurs, whereas they are not statistically significant for employees.

These results are estimated at the parent level, and include individuals who had children while married, single, or cohabiting, from one or several relationships. The effect of a firstborn daughter raising the overall number of children has been documented in married couples (e.g. [Dahl and Moretti \(2008\)](#)), but an additional mechanism is relationship dissolution following the birth of a daughter, which may lead to subsequent children from other relationships. We document this pattern in [Table A6](#). Having a firstborn daughter increases the probability that the couple will no longer be cohabiting, five years after the birth of the first child. This effect is statistically significant in the employees sample, an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the probability of relationship dissolution, but double (0.8-0.9 percentage points) for the sample of entrepreneurs.

Another mechanism through which families can achieve their desired family size and gender composition is adoption. In [table A7](#) we compare the fraction of daughters among adoptive parents, separately for employees, entrepreneurs in smaller firms, and CEOs, by the gender of the adoptive parent and the gender composition of their industry. In regression estimates shown in [Table 5](#), we find entrepreneurs are less likely to adopt daughters. Interestingly, more than 65% of female CEOs adopt girls. Despite the sample sizes for female CEOs being small, we can reject the null that the fraction of adopted girls is the same as in the overall population.

These results suggest the gender of the firstborn child has an effect on overall family size for CEOs and entrepreneurs. This raises questions about the validity of instruments based on the gender composition of the first child or the gender composition of children. These concerns are exacerbated by the evidence we report below on how families displaying son-biased fertility preferences differ in how they groom sons and daughters for succession. As such, the gender composition of children may impact firm prospects through several channels apart from the ultimate decision to appoint a family CEO or not.

5.2 Human capital accumulation

In Table 6 we examine how the probability that daughters pursue the same field of study as the parent varies with entrepreneurial status, parent's gender, and whether the parent's industry is male or female dominated. Daughters are more likely than sons to follow the same field of study as their mothers, but this pattern predominantly holds when the mother is working in a female dominated industry. Daughters are much less likely than brothers to pursue the field of study of a father working in a male dominated industry, but the coefficients become considerably less negative if the father works in a female dominated industry. We summarize these patterns for the offspring of CEOs in family firms in Figure 2A, displaying the gap between daughters and brothers in the likelihood of following the parent's field of study against the fraction female employees for each two-digit industry. There is a correlation between the gender predominance in the parent's industry and the likelihood that daughters will follow the parent's field of study. This suggests same-gender patterns of following in the parent's footsteps are strongly mediated by the gender specificity of the parent's industry. Similar patterns hold for the children of CEOs in non-family firms (Appendix Figure 4A) and children of retiring entrepreneurs without explicit CEO positions (Appendix Figure 5A).

Panel B of Table 6 shows differences between sons and daughters in whether they ever worked in the same firm as their parents before the year of succession.²² Sons of CEOs in family owned businesses are considerably more likely than their sisters to work in the same firm as their parents. About 43 per cent of sons of entrepreneurs in male dominated industries have joint experience with their fathers, while their sisters are 24 percentage points less likely to have joint experience, a gap wider than that observed for employees, entrepreneurs or CEOs in non-family owned enterprises. The pattern is reversed, although magnitudes are smaller, when the mother is an entrepreneur in a female-dominated industry. It is then daughters who are 10 percentage points more likely than their brothers to be working in the same firm as their mother in family owned firms. These patterns are summarized at the two-digit industry level in Figure 2B, which shows the strong correlation between the likelihood of daughters working in the family business and the fraction of female employees in the industry.

Consistent with the patterns of overall experience accumulation, we find that sons of CEOs in family firms also have their first formal employment experience earlier than their sisters, and in fact earlier than sons of employees or other types of entrepreneurs. These results are presented in Table A9. Relative to

²²Similar patterns for total years of experience in the same firm as the parent are shown in Table A8.

their brothers, daughters of entrepreneurs have their first formal employment experience later if the industry of the entrepreneur parent is male dominated. Interestingly, if parents are employed in a female dominated industry, daughters have their first employment experience earlier than their brothers.

Daughters accumulate more years of schooling overall than their brothers, regardless of parent's entrepreneurial status or industry. The higher level of educational attainment for daughters relative to brothers holds for all families, but the relative educational gap is particularly high for children of CEOs in family owned businesses. Results in Table A10 indicate that daughters of entrepreneurs accumulate more education than their brothers when the entrepreneur parent works in a male dominated industry. Conversely, the educational advantage is relatively smaller when the family business is operating in a female-dominated industry. These results are consistent with the higher work experience and earlier first episode of employment of sons of entrepreneurs in male-dominated industries.

We further investigate whether human capital accumulation patterns differ in families classified as exhibiting son-biased fertility preferences. In Table A11 we report daughters of entrepreneurs accumulate even less work experience in their parent's industry in son-biased families. These effects are largest for entrepreneur fathers in male-dominated industries. We also find evidence of differential transmission of fields of study among entrepreneurs in son-biased families in Table A12. The magnitude of the same-gender field of study following is smaller for daughters in son-biased families.

So far our analysis of human capital accumulation has focused on comparing brothers and sisters within families. In Table A13 we report differences in field of study following and joint experience between daughters and sons in families with only daughters and respectively only sons. Patterns of gender gaps between sons and daughters are overall very similar, but the absolute levels of joint experience with the parent CEO differ considerably. It appears the presence of a daughter reduces sons' work experience in the family firm if the firm operates in a female-dominated field. Father CEOs operating in female-dominated industries work with their sons 43 percent of the time if they only have sons, but only 22 percent of the time if a daughter is present. Similarly, sons work with their mother CEOs in female dominated industries 37 percent of the time if they have no sisters, but only 19 percent of the time in families with both sons and daughters.

5.3 Succession outcomes

Before analyzing the actual succession decision, we examine differences in board membership and share ownership between sons and daughters before the year of succession. Daughters are less likely than sons to ever serve on the board of the firm before succession. We show these results in Table 7 (for families with both sons and daughters) and Table A14 (for families with only sons or only daughters). The magnitude of the gender gap in board membership is larger in family owned firms, for father entrepreneurs, and in male dominated industries. We find similar patterns when analyzing share ownership before succession. The magnitude of the gap is largest in family owned firms in male dominated industries led by a father CEO: daughters are 14.9% less likely to own any shares in the firm before succession relative to their brothers. The magnitude of the gender gap between offspring decreases in female dominated industries, and becomes statistically insignificant if the mother is a CEO in such industries.

Table 8 quantifies the gap in the probability of succession for daughters (relative to their brothers) across different samples: exiting CEOs in non-family businesses, CEOs in family businesses, and self-employed retiring after age 57. Among the latter group, we further distinguish between entrepreneurs whose firm is a sole proprietorship (natural person), limited liability companies or partnerships. The table also examines how the daughter coefficient varies by parent's industry, comparing gender succession patterns in male versus female-dominated industries. Across all samples, daughters are generally less likely than sons to take over, except in some instances when the entrepreneur parent is the mother and works in a female-dominated industry. Family owned businesses with an explicit board and CEO position display the highest magnitudes of the "daughter penalty" in succession, albeit from a higher overall baseline rate of family successions. Succession patterns are also aligned with the gender composition of the retiring CEO/entrepreneur's industry. The daughter's lower likelihood of becoming a successor is particularly high if the entrepreneur father is working in a male dominated industry, and becomes less negative if the father works in a female dominated industry or if the mother is an entrepreneur. In Figure 2C we plot the daughter coefficient in the succession equation, estimated separately for two-digit industries, against the proportion of female employees in the industry. The slopes closely resemble the patterns observed at the stage of human capital accumulation in Figures 2A and 2B.

In Table A15 we further show the gap between between daughters and sons in the likelihood of succession is higher in families that exhibit son-biased fertility stopping rules. These effects are however only

present when the exiting CEO/entrepreneur is a father working in a male-dominated industry.

Lastly, we examine gender gaps in succession in families with only sons or only daughters. Results in Table A16 point to very similar gaps compared to families with both sons and daughters. One notable difference is that daughters are more likely to take over in family businesses in male-dominated industries if they have no brothers. The gender gap is 16.9 per cent across families with only daughters or only sons, but it reaches 26.4 per cent in families with both offspring genders.

5.4 Firm outcomes

Table 9 shows the impact of CEO transitions on firm performance. In Panel A we compare firm activity and performance when a family member is appointed CEO versus when the successor is an unrelated CEO. We find evidence of lower revenue and a reduction in the number of employees in the OLS regressions, but not in the median regressions. Impacts on OROA are positive and imprecise in OLS regressions, and negative and statistically significant in median regressions, but only on unadjusted OROA. Using the gender of the firstborn child as an instrument for the appointment of a family CEO (Pérez-González (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Bach (2016)), our estimates become imprecise, despite the first stage F statistic being fairly large (approximately 78).

Descriptive evidence in Figure 3 on the evolution of firm revenue around the succession event suggests fundamental differences in firm outcomes between successions in favor of children compared to other family successors. In Panel B of Table 9, we compare the performance of children of CEOs against that of unrelated CEOs. We find little evidence of underperformance of child CEOs (a small statistically significant negative effect on OROA, but not industry adjusted OROA in median regressions), and generally positive effects on turnover, assets, number of employees and the overall wage bill, particularly in the median regression. IV results remain imprecise. When we turn our attention to appointments of family members other than children, we find, in the OLS and median regression results, a negative association with turnover and assets, and a decline in the number of employees and the overall wage bill. We also find larger statistically significant negative effects on unadjusted OROA.

We also undertook the analysis separately for family owned businesses in Table A18. The same patterns hold: the OLS and median regression effects for children of CEOs taking over are either positive and statistically significant or not statistically significant. The IV results remain imprecise. We find positive

statistically significant effects on OROA for child successors, and continue to find large negative effects on revenue, assets, employees and aggregate wage bill when other family members take over.

Results in non-family owned businesses in Table A19 are generally more imprecise, and first stage F statistics become much smaller, but we find little evidence of negative effects of appointing a child CEO. Here again, we find some statistically negative impacts on revenue and unadjusted OROA from appointments in favor of other family members.

Turning to smaller firms without a board and CEO, OLS and median regression results in Table A20 indicate positive effects on firm turnover, assets, number of employees and overall wage bill of having a child continuing employment in the firm of the retiring entrepreneur. The IV estimates are again statistically insignificant.

Overall, these results suggest the negative effects of appointing a family member as CEO are driven by family members other than the children of the CEO, although we cannot establish a causal effect, given the imprecision of our IV estimates.²³ Summary statistics in Table 2 show that the majority of family successions not involving children occur when the CEO exits at younger ages. This raises a host of issues about how earlier CEO exits differ from later life CEO exits.

Our results diverge somewhat from established findings in the literature (Bennedsen et al. (2007), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Pérez-González (2006), Cucculelli and Micucci (2008)). Other authors have found similarly mixed effects indicating that child successors of CEOs may not necessarily hurt firm performance. Kustec et al. (2025) find that children of family firm CEOs who have experience outside the family firm perform on par with professionals, while sons exclusively employed by the family firm tend to under-perform. Using data on Swedish firms and their CEOs, Bach (2016) does not find negative effects of dynastic successions on firm performance in OLS regressions and finds imprecise effects using the gender of the firstborn child as an instrumental variable.

The summary statistics in Table 2 show the circumstances under which a child takes over are fundamentally different from those when another family member or a professional takes over. Successions in favor of children are much more likely to follow the retirement or death of the exiting CEO. In particular, daughters

²³In other specifications available from the authors, we have also used other instrumental variables which plausibly affect the appointment of a family, as opposed to a professional CEO, and do not have a direct impact on the firm other than through the appointment decision. We have used the fraction of CEOs with business degrees in the two-digit industry, or the fraction of CEOs with a college education. The IV results remain imprecise, despite fairly strong first-stage effects.

are more likely to take over upon the death of the exiting CEO without having worked in the firm, as shown in Table A17. These different circumstances might play a role in explaining differential firm performance before and after succession.²⁴

5.5 Children's outcomes

Table 10 summarizes the differences between daughters and sons in earnings, employment and involvement in the firm of the exiting CEO, four years before the CEO succession and five years thereafter. Consistent with the human capital accumulation processes described in Tables 6 and A8, we find daughters are less likely than their brothers to be employed by the firm of the exiting CEO four years before succession, but the effects are only statistically significant when the father was the CEO, -11% in male dominated industries and -4.3% in female dominated industries. Five years after succession, the employment gap narrows to -7.4% and -2.2%, respectively. Overall, the incomes of daughters are lower than those of their brothers, but the gap depends on the industry of the parent CEO. The gap is 12% for daughters with a mother CEO, but if the father or mother is a CEO in a male-dominated industry, the gap is much larger, respectively 24% and 27%.

Five years after succession, the earnings gap widens in all industries, even in the female-dominated ones. Part of the bigger gap is explained by sons' higher rates of access to managerial positions. When the father was the CEO sons were more likely than daughters to hold managerial positions four years before the succession event. After the succession, the managerial position gap widens in all industries, even when the retiring CEO was the mother. Similarly, the gap in share ownership and board membership widens after succession.²⁵

On becoming CEO after the exit of a parent, we find the impact on the earnings of sons is small, but taking over leadership of the firm boosts the earnings of daughters. This is illustrated in Figure A6. We summarize these effects in a difference-in-difference analysis in Table A21, where we find statistically

²⁴We have also estimated the descriptive OLS and median regressions separately for daughter and son successors. In results available from the authors, we generally find lower coefficients for daughters than sons, but we do not find systematic statistically significant evidence that daughters under-perform relative to professional CEOs. In Figure A7 we also plot firm revenue around the time of succession, showing outcomes for sons and daughters relative to other successors.

²⁵Some successions occur at the death of the exiting CEO (Table 2), and may be linked to the inheritance process. The 1965 Finnish Inheritance Code designates the primary right to inherit with direct descendants (rather than the spouse). The Code of Inheritance specifies: 'Each child shall receive an equal share of the inheritance'.

insignificant effects for sons who become CEOs relative to sons who do not, but earnings gains of up to 19 per cent for daughters who become CEOs in family firms. These figures suggest the earnings gap between daughters and sons of CEOs is likely to narrow only if daughters become CEOs. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the earnings gap between daughters and sons depends on the type of CEO transition in family firms. The gap is stable if sons become CEOs, but narrows and becomes statistically insignificant when daughters are preferred for succession. The figure also highlights two other stylized facts: 1) the gap widens when other family members or professional CEOs take over the firm and 2) the magnitude of the earnings gap between the sibling who eventually takes over and siblings of the opposite sex is well established four years before succession.

6 Conclusion

Succession is a critical inflection point in the life of a family business. We examine: how entrepreneurs prepare for this leadership transition event; the event itself; and subsequent earnings adjustments to the offspring and changes in the firm performance. Our results suggest that preparing for this transition is really an investment undertaken over many years, beginning with perpetuating the family dynasty with births and adoptions, and followed by formal schooling and informal preparatory work at the family firm.

Son-biased fertility preferences are correlated with later decisions about succession. The gender specificity of the industry of the firm is highly predictive of fertility, human capital accumulation, and succession decisions. We also find stock ownership, board membership and earnings gaps between sons and daughters are well established before the event of succession. These findings suggest that the planning horizon for family business successions is very long, and that the full ramifications of permanent policy shifts are only revealed in the long run.

Regarding firm outcomes, we find that the gender of the entrepreneur's first child directly influences the growth of smaller firms and more generally affects the family size of entrepreneurs and CEOs. Although the gender of the firstborn is (arguably) random, actions taken by the family between the time of first birth and succession, including having more births, training offspring, and so on, depend on the gender of the firstborn. Not all of these intermediate actions are observed, and the nature of their dependence is complex.

Our descriptive analysis around the time of succession finds limited evidence of under-performance by

the entrepreneur's children relative to professionals, or unrelated CEOs. Negative effects arise primarily from CEO successions in favor of other family members. Closer examination of CEO successions reveals that transitions to children, other family members, or unrelated professionals occur at distinct stages of the exiting CEO's career. Children most often take over at the retirement stage or upon the CEO's death, whereas other family members assume leadership when the exiting CEO is significantly younger. Additionally, we observe key differences between son and daughter successors. Daughters are more likely to take over following the CEO's death without prior work experience in the firm. This evidence suggests that refining the context of CEO exits may illuminate the causal role of individual traits and training in the firm succession, including its subsequent performance.

Our descriptive analysis is neither causal nor structural. It is, therefore, of limited use in explaining why the behavior we observe in the data arises, or how patterns of succession would change in response to new taxation policies and other innovations. Nevertheless, our findings are helpful in selecting instruments that might be used in empirical analyses of causation and in the choice of assumptions that form a structural econometric model. For example, the statistical importance of family size, education, and working within the firm prior to taking on a leadership role suggests that structural models seeking to explain succession are more likely to be useful if they explicitly incorporate the dynamic factors that lead up to succession. And while our regressions cannot predict how family businesses will respond to new tax law about inheritances, for example, our findings strongly suggest that temporary changes in policy may have little effect, and that permanent changes might work their way through the system only slowly but with much larger long-term ramifications.


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
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Figure 1: Ratio of Daughter CEO Successors to Son Successors,
all Industries (left) and Female-dominated Industries (right)




Notes: Figures show the ratio of CEO successions in favor of daughters to successions in favor of sons, 1997-2018. On average, each year we observe 67 successions in female-dominated industries and 210 successions in male-dominated industries. An industry is female/male dominated if more/less than 50% of the employees in the industry are female.


Figure 2: Human Capital Accumulation and Succession Decisions, CEOs in Family Firms and their Offspring



(A) Child has the same field of study as the CEO parent




(B) Child has worked in the same firm as the CEO parent by the time of succession



(C) Child of departing CEO took over as CEO


Notes: Scatterplots show the coefficient on daughters (relative to brothers) in equation 2. Hollow dots indicate coefficients which are not statistically significant. Regressions are estimated separately by the modal two-digit industry of employment of the parent for field of study and same firm experience regressions, and the industry of the firm from which the parent CEO exits for succession outcomes (panel C). Field of study refers to the field of the highest degree attained. AGR: Agriculture, FOR: Forestry + manufacturing of wood products, LMFT: Light manufacturing, PUB: Publishing, HMFT: Heavy manufacturing, UTI: Utilities, CON: Construction and mining, REP: Repairs of motor vehicles, WHO: Wholesale trade, RET: Retail trade, HOT: Hotels and restaurants, TRA: Transportation, FIN: Financial intermediation, REA: Real estate activities, ITC: Information technology and communication, OBA: Other business activities + research, EDU: Education, HLT: Health and social work, CUL: Cultural activities.

Figure 3: Evolution of Firm Revenue by Type of Succession, Family Firms



Notes: This figure plots the change in log revenue for firms where the family of the exiting CEO holds the majority of shares, 2007-2019. This graph plots the log of firm revenue around the time of the succession event: $Y_{it} = \sum_{\ell \in (-4, \dots, 5)} \beta_{\ell} D_{i,t}^{\ell} + \varepsilon_{it}$. Coefficients normalized to T-5 years before the succession year. The 'Other family CEO' category includes spouses, siblings, parents and children-in-law.

Figure 4: Evolution of the Gap between Daughters' and Sons' Incomes around CEO Succession in Family Firms



Notes: Figure shows the earnings gap between the daughters and sons of exiting CEO around the succession event, by the type of transition.

Table 1: CEO and Entrepreneur Successions, Summary Statistics

		Proportion of incoming CEOs who are a:			
	Obs.	Family member	Child	Son	Daughter
A. CEO transitions, 1994-2019, by departing CEO age:					
30-39	139	0.273	0.022	0.022	
40-49	5,105	0.169	0.035	0.028	0.007
50-59	12,747	0.198	0.116	0.096	0.020
60-69	9,676	0.297	0.241	0.195	0.046
70+	1,512	0.521	0.448	0.343	0.103
All	29,181	0.271	0.223	0.177	0.047
B. CEO transitions, firms without family majority ownership, 2007-2019, by departing CEO age:					
30-39	40	0.200			
40-49	2,137	0.091	0.015	0.008	0.006
50-59	5,429	0.084	0.041	0.033	0.008
60-69	4,611	0.147	0.112	0.092	0.021
70+	641	0.371	0.315	0.232	0.080
All	12,859	0.156	0.135	0.103	0.032
C. CEO transitions, family owned firms, 2007-2019, by departing CEO age:					
30-39	32	0.375			
40-49	692	0.389	0.075	0.058	0.017
50-59	1,883	0.500	0.304	0.254	0.050
60-69	2,364	0.587	0.480	0.382	0.098
70+	492	0.738	0.632	0.502	0.130
All	5,463	0.559	0.444	0.355	0.089
D. Entrepreneurs without explicit CEO role ^a :					
All	42,705	0.140	0.081	0.058	0.019
Natural persons	21,672	0.066	0.038	0.026	0.009
Limited liability companies	7,276	0.299	0.210	0.147	0.054
Partnerships and others	5,150	0.223	0.152	0.112	0.033
Legal form information missing	8,607	0.140	0.036	0.031	0.004

Notes: This table displays summary statistics for the last observed CEO succession or retirement decision (as of 2019). Appendix Table A2 shows all CEO successions (including earlier successions for individuals observed exiting multiple times). Family members include the CEO's parents, spouses, siblings, children and children-in-law. There are 5 transitions at ages 20-29 in non-family owned firms. In family owned firms, there are 21 transitions between the ages of 20 and 29 (of which 0.381 are linked to a family member). a. Sample of individuals recorded as self-employed at age 57 without an explicit CEO role but linked (employed) to a specific firm in administrative data. In their case, columns 2-5 indicate whether a family member/child/son/daughter are working for the same firm after the parent is no longer working for the firm.

Table 2: Succession Summary Statistics, Family Businesses

	Incoming CEO			
	Professional	Son	Daughter	Other family
<i>Mean /(s.e. Mean)</i>				
Tenure of the exiting CEO	7.972 (0.066)	11.872 (0.119)	11.969 (0.245)	8.347 (0.105)
Previous CEO died	0.026 (0.002)	0.095 (0.006)	0.135 (0.015)	0.071 (0.005)
Previous CEO retired	0.114 (0.004)	0.391 (0.010)	0.454 (0.021)	0.096 (0.006)
Age of exiting CEO	48.369 (0.150)	61.928 (0.151)	63.037 (0.317)	45.516 (0.234)
Age of new CEO	41.289 (0.122)	33.380 (0.159)	34.894 (0.336)	47.080 (0.231)
Years of schooling new CEO	14.338 (0.028)	13.596 (0.045)	14.442 (0.092)	14.257 (0.045)
% College degree new CEO	0.504 (0.006)	0.408 (0.010)	0.502 (0.022)	0.480 (0.010)
Any previous experience in the firm	0.317 (0.006)	0.651 (0.010)	0.528 (0.022)	0.530 (0.010)
Any previous managerial experience	0.475 (0.006)	0.308 (0.010)	0.281 (0.019)	0.446 (0.010)
Any experience outside the firm	0.959 (0.002)	0.811 (0.008)	0.889 (0.014)	0.972 (0.003)
Observations	6,781	2,216	540	2,725

Notes: This table summarizes some of the circumstances surrounding the CEO succession process. The four categories in the columns indicate mutually exclusive and exhaustive types of incoming CEOs. The excluded category for the previous CEO exit consists of cases where the exiting CEO did not die (row 2) or retire (row 3). Column 2 shows averages in cases where a professional (unrelated) CEO takes over, while columns 3-5 correspond to sons, daughters and other family members of the exiting CEO taking over. The sample is restricted to family firms (the family of the exiting CEO holds the majority of shares), for years 2007-2019, when shareholding information is available. Summary statistics for firms without family majority ownership are shown in Table A3.

Table 3: Summary Statistics, Number and Gender of Children

	Always	Entrepreneurs			Entrepreneurs	CEOs,	CEOs,	CEOs,
	employees	Tercile 1	Tercile 2	Tercile 3	at age 57	all	non-family firms	family firms
% Had no children	18.59	12.78	11.89	13.60	12.41	8.19	8.03	6.13
% One child	17.99	15.17	14.86	13.59	15.03	13.91	13.06	13.71
Ratio boys/girls	1.07	1.08	1.14	1.16	1.14	1.21	1.13	1.29
% Two children	37.37	35.32	36.77	37.21	38.73	42.24	43.48	41.29
Ratio all boys /all girls	1.12	1.14	1.25	1.22	1.18	1.14	1.10	1.23
Daughter then son/...								
.../Son then daughter	1.008	1.006	0.997	1.028	1.044	1.032	1.030	1.135
% More than two children	25.62	36.32	36.12	35.25	33.41	35.32	35.16	38.59
Ratio all boys / all girls	1.11	1.10	1.13	1.06	1.03	1.25	1.16	1.65
Several daughters then son/...								
...Several sons then daughter	1.013	1.033	1.059	1.106	1.111	1.036	1.006	1.085
Observations (parents)	847,584	66,234	61,946	65,767	61,890	22,118	8,692	3,151
Average number of children	2.24	2.52	2.50	2.49	2.43	2.45	2.45	2.54
Overall ratio boys/girls	1.04	1.04	1.07	1.05	1.04	1.06	1.05	1.10

Notes: This table shows summary statistics on the family composition of individuals aged 57 or older, observed in administrative data in 2019. CEO (all) denotes individuals recorded as CEOs in firm administrative data 1994-2019. CEOs, non-family firms(family firms) is the sample of CEOs in firms without(with) family majority ownership, 2007-2019. The 'Always Employees' category denotes individuals who have never been recorded as self-employed. 'Entrepreneurs' are individuals recorded as self-employed, whom we allocated to terciles based on how many years they have been registered as self-employed between 1995 and 2019. 'Entrepreneurs at age 57' is a sample of individuals who are observed recorded as self-employed at age 57 between 2001 and 2009.

Table 4: Effect of a Female Firstborn on the Total Number of Children

	Obs.	Effect of first born daughter				
		All	Father in MD industry	Father in FD industry	Mother in MD industry	Mother in FD industry
Employees	792,362	0.028** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.004)
Tercile 1 Entrepreneurs	65,568	0.032** (0.010)	0.021 (0.022)	0.054** (0.020)	0.006 (0.030)	0.029 (0.017)
Tercile 2 Entrepreneurs	59,607	0.034** (0.011)	0.062*** (0.018)	−0.004 (0.023)	0.046 (0.028)	0.020 (0.020)
Tercile 3 Entrepreneurs	60,171	0.056*** (0.011)	0.054*** (0.015)	0.054* (0.027)	0.074* (0.029)	0.051* (0.021)
Entrepreneurs at age 57 sample	39,384	0.061*** (0.012)	0.069*** (0.019)	0.014 (0.028)	0.12*** (0.033)	0.041 (0.026)
CEOs, all	25,758	0.045** (0.012)	0.064* (0.027)	0.006 (0.023)	0.11 (0.063)	0.073* (0.032)
CEOs, non-family firms	12,680	0.019 (0.021)	0.030 (0.037)	0.025 (0.031)	−0.009 (0.076)	−0.014 (0.047)
CEOs, family firms	4,006	0.083 (0.043)	0.098 (0.066)	−0.032 (0.088)	0.38* (0.16)	0.091 (0.087)
Both parents entrepreneurs	81,217	0.063*** (0.010)	0.085*** (0.019)	0.042 (0.026)	0.058** (0.021)	0.057*** (0.018)

Notes: This table shows the coefficient β in equation 1. Family composition is observed in administrative data in 2018, for individuals aged 50 and above. In column 2 ('All'), each parent is treated as an observation. As such, an individual may appear twice in the sample. We have estimated this specification using weights of 1/2 for individuals observed twice. Results are very similar (in magnitude as well as patterns of statistical significance) and are available from the authors. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the parent's two-digit industry. The Employees category denotes individuals who have never been recorded as self-employed. 'Entrepreneurs' are individuals recorded as self-employed, whom we allocated to terciles based on how many years they have been registered as self-employed between 1995 and 2019. Both parents are identified as entrepreneurs if they are allocated to any of the terciles. CEO information is based on Finnish board data (PRH_BOARD), years 1994-2019, and firm ownership data (FLOWN_OWNER), years 2006-2019. Non-family owned and family owned businesses -samples include only CEOs that stepped down between 2007 and 2019, as information on ownership is only available starting 2006. Regressions include controls for parental age, gender, income, place of residence and education. Robust standard errors in parantheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table 5: CEO/Entrepreneur Status and the Gender of Adopted Children

	Adopted child is a girl
Parent ever self-employed	−0.024* (0.011)
Adoptive parent female × Parent ever self-employed	0.006 (0.016)
Parent ever CEO	0.001 (0.019)
Adoptive parent female × Parent ever CEO	0.126** (0.045)
Adoptive parent female	0.003 (0.004)
Constant	0.498*** (0.004)
Observations	36,418

Notes: This table shows results from a linear probability model where the dependent variable is whether the adopted child is a girl. The regression is estimated using administrative data from 2019 on all adopted children and parents. The regression includes indicator variables for whether the adoptive parent was ever self-employed or ever held a CEO role. These are interacted with an indicator for whether the adoptive parent was female. Coefficients are relative to children adopted by parents who were always employees (omitted category). The specification uses weights of 1/2 for children adopted by two parents and 1 for children adopted by one parent in the dataset. Further summary statistics and number of observations by groups are shown in Table A7. Standard errors are clustered at the adopted child level. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table 6: Offspring Human Capital Accumulation,
Gap Between Daughters and Sons, Within - Family Estimates

	Father in:		Mother in:	
	MD industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
A. Same field of study as parent				
Employees	-0.31*** (0.003) [0.40]	-0.15*** (0.002) [0.25]	-0.022*** (0.004) [0.20]	0.10*** (0.002) [0.13]
Entrepreneurs	-0.28*** (0.009) [0.38]	-0.15*** (0.009) [0.29]	0.003 (0.013) [0.19]	0.10*** (0.006) [0.13]
CEOs, all	-0.23*** (0.011) [0.37]	-0.094*** (0.011) [0.27]	0.003 (0.032) [0.22]	0.073*** (0.018) [0.16]
CEOs, non-family firms	-0.18*** (0.016) [0.34]	-0.099*** (0.010) [0.23]	0.006 (0.054) [0.22]	0.063* (0.027) [0.16]
CEOs, family firms	-0.31*** (0.022) [0.43]	-0.14*** (0.030) [0.27]	0.053 (0.057) [0.19]	0.100* (0.041) [0.17]
B. Any joint (same firm) experience with parent				
Employees	-0.11*** (0.002) [0.18]	-0.016*** (0.002) [0.082]	0.023*** (0.003) [0.16]	0.085*** (0.001) [0.076]
Entrepreneurs	-0.17*** (0.004) [0.25]	-0.065*** (0.007) [0.19]	-0.069*** (0.006) [0.18]	0.045*** (0.006) [0.12]
CEOs, all	-0.15*** (0.006) [0.34]	-0.031*** (0.005) [0.17]	-0.051** (0.017) [0.33]	0.072*** (0.008) [0.16]
CEOs, non-family firms	-0.099*** (0.007) [0.29]	-0.022*** (0.005) [0.15]	-0.034 (0.021) [0.31]	0.072*** (0.010) [0.14]
CEOs, family firms	-0.24*** (0.010) [0.42]	-0.059*** (0.010) [0.22]	-0.081** (0.030) [0.37]	0.072*** (0.016) [0.19]

Notes: This table shows the coefficient on Daughters in equation 2. The specification includes parent fixed effects and is estimated on a sample of parents who have both daughters and sons. Table A13 shows estimates (without parent fixed effects) for a sample of parents with only daughters or only sons. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the industry. Each coefficient comes from a different regression, for different combinations of outcomes and whether the parents' modal industry over their careers was male- or female-dominated. Square brackets indicate the average outcome for sons. Sample restricted to children who are at least 30 years old. Standard errors clustered at the parent level. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table 7: Board Membership and Share Ownership,
Gap between Daughters and Sons, Within - Family Estimates

	Father		Mother	
	MD industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
A. Child of CEO ever on the board before succession				
1. CEOs, all	-0.024*** (0.001) [0.022]	-0.019*** (0.002) [0.021]	-0.012*** (0.003) [0.026]	-0.011 (0.006) [0.044]
2. CEOs, non-family owned firms	-0.014*** (0.001) [0.014]	-0.014*** (0.003) [0.012]	-0.004 (0.003) [0.014]	-0.006 (0.008) [0.019]
3. CEOs, family owned firms	-0.051*** (0.005) [0.052]	-0.028*** (0.008) [0.050]	-0.040*** (0.012) [0.060]	-0.013 (0.012) [0.060]
B. Child of exiting CEO ever held shares in the firm before succession				
1. CEOs, all	-0.045*** (0.002) [0.058]	-0.029*** (0.004) [0.067]	-0.012** (0.004) [0.059]	0.019* (0.009) [0.107]
2. CEOs, non-family owned firms	-0.013*** (0.001) [0.020]	-0.011*** (0.003) [0.026]	-0.004 (0.003) [0.024]	0.008 (0.008) [0.050]
3. CEOs, family owned firms	-0.149*** (0.007) [0.186]	-0.061*** (0.010) [0.156]	-0.042** (0.015) [0.193]	0.029 (0.016) [0.165]

Notes: This table show the coefficient on Daughters in equation 2. The specification includes parent fixed effects and is estimated on a sample of parents who have both daughters and sons. Table A14 shows estimates (without parent fixed effects) for a sample of parents with only daughters or only sons. Each coefficient comes from a different regression, for different combinations of outcomes and whether the firm of the parent was in a male- or female-dominated industry. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified examining if the industry where the firm operates had more male or female employees in the transfer year. Square brackets indicate the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the parent level. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table 8: Gap Between Daughters and Sons in Succeeding the Exiting CEO,
Within-Family Estimates

	Father		Mother	
	MD Industry	FD Industry	MD Industry	FD Industry
A. Child of departing CEO becomes CEO, all				
Daughter	-0.099*** (0.005) [0.056]	-0.050** (0.006) [0.037]	-0.046** (0.013) [0.061]	-0.033** (0.012) [0.052]
Obs.	22,612	8,141	3,793	3,805
A1. Child of departing CEO becomes CEO, non-family businesses				
Daughter	-0.040*** (0.004) [0.023]	-0.028** (0.006) [0.014]	-0.027* (0.013) [0.037]	-0.027 (0.014) [0.024]
Obs.	13,383	3,968	2,130	1,607
A2. Child of departing CEO becomes CEO, family businesses				
Daughter	-0.264*** (0.014) [0.159]	-0.115*** (0.027) [0.116]	-0.092* (0.036) [0.124]	-0.056 (0.032) [0.092]
Obs.	5,078	1,155	969	899
B. Child works in firm after parent retires, self-employed sample ^a				
Daughter	-0.087*** (0.003) [0.061]	-0.047*** (0.007) [0.078]	-0.088*** (0.006) [0.076]	0.019*** (0.004) [0.049]
Obs.	47,013	9,122	10,804	16,886
B1. Child works in firm after parent retires, sole proprietorship				
Daughter	-0.055*** (0.004) [0.034]	-0.030*** (0.017) [0.147]	-0.064*** (0.021) [0.185]	0.012** (0.018) [0.141]
Obs.	19,346	3,945	2,554	10,904
B2. Child works in firm after parent retires, limited liability companies				
Daughter	-0.163*** (0.009) [0.136]	-0.084*** (0.017) [0.147]	-0.142*** (0.021) [0.185]	0.024 (0.018) [0.141]
Obs.	9,144	2,619	2,054	2,234
B3. Child works in firm after parent retires, partnerships and others				
Daughter	-0.177*** (0.011) [0.107]	-0.031* (0.015) [0.093]	-0.139*** (0.026) [0.133]	0.039* (0.015) [0.102]
Obs.	5,450	2,102	1,073	2,646

Notes: This table shows the coefficient on Daughters in equation 2. Each coefficient comes from a different regression. The specification includes parent fixed effects and is estimated on a sample of parents who have both daughters and sons. Table A16 shows estimates (without parent fixed effects) for a sample of parents with only daughters or only sons. Panel B shows results for all self-employed retiring individuals, including those for whom the legal status of the firm is missing, while panels B1-B3 show results for firms with explicit legal status. MD and FD indicate male- and female-dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the industry. Square brackets indicate the mean of the dependent variable. Regressions include parent fixed effects and child age fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the parent level. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table 9: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Professional Versus Family Transition
(All Firms with CEO Roles)

		Differences around CEO successions:					
	First stage	Ln revenue	Ln assets	Ln employees	Ln wages	OROA	OROA, ind. adj.
A. Family vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Family CEO	-	-0.073***	-0.001	-0.027*	-0.011	0.064	0.12
	-	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.095)	(0.12)
2. Median regression							
Family CEO	-	0.001	0.036***	0.004	0.024	-0.010***	-0.002
	-	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.039)
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.053***	-0.26	0.12	-0.079	0.012	-0.27	1.82
	(0.006)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(2.70)	(3.05)
F	77.4						
Mean		0.021	0.067	-0.021	0.034	-0.12	-0.51
Median		0.036	0.033	0	0.058	-0.016	-0.15
N	18,945	18,945	18,945	18,945	18,945	18,945	18,945
B. Child vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Child CEO	-	-0.017	0.034**	0.011	0.036*	0.089	0.14
	-	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.095)	(0.13)
2. Median regression							
Child CEO	-	0.021*	0.056***	0.022**	0.043***	-0.009**	0.029
	-	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.042)
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.071***	-0.22	0.074	-0.095	0.016	-0.26	1.34
	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(2.15)	(2.41)
F	165.4						
Mean		0.035	0.072	-0.013	0.042	-0.12	-0.52
Median		0.040	0.037	0.005	0.062	-0.015	-0.15
N	17,687	17,687	17,687	17,687	17,687	17,687	17,687
C. Other family vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Other family CEO		-0.20***	-0.081**	-0.12***	-0.12**	0.0035	0.072
		(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.10)	(0.17)
2. Median regression							
Other family CEO		-0.056***	-0.027	-0.052***	-0.031	-0.014**	-0.10
		(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.084)
3. IV, first born daughter	0.013***	1.86	0.24	0.95	1.06	1.81	-4.60
	(0.004)	(1.35)	(0.93)	(0.97)	(1.18)	(13.4)	(14.9)
F	9.08						
Mean		0.021	0.060	-0.024	0.026	-0.13	-0.53
Median		0.032	0.022	-0.001	0.052	-0.014	-0.15
N	15,968	15,968	15,968	15,968	15,968	15,968	15,968

Notes: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates in equation 5, along with the first stage and 2SLS estimates associated with using an indicator for the gender of the first born child as an instrument for the FamilyCEO variable. The sample includes all firms with explicit CEO roles which underwent a succession between 2002 and 2016. The outcome variable indicates the difference between average firm outcomes in the three years after succession and three years before the succession year. Regressions include controls for the year of the transition. Tables A18, A19 and A20 show estimates for family-owned businesses, non-family owned businesses and respectively the sample of firms of entrepreneurs observed retiring after age 57. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table 10: Outcomes of the Children of CEOs, Pre- and Post- Succession, Daughter-Son differences

	Father		Mother	
	MD industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
<i>Coef. / (s.e.) [$\bar{Y}$]</i>				
<i>A. Four years before succession</i>				
Log total income	-0.24*** (0.026) [9.78]	-0.20*** (0.036) [9.64]	-0.27* (0.11) [9.76]	-0.12* (0.058) [9.77]
Log total income if employed	-0.29*** (0.029) [10.1]	-0.24*** (0.046) [10.0]	-0.38** (0.12) [10.1]	-0.15* (0.068) [10.1]
Managerial position	-0.032*** (0.007) [0.025]	-0.024** (0.008) [0.023]	-0.033 (0.023) [0.027]	-0.008 (0.012) [0.022]
Owens any shares	-0.023*** (0.005) [0.027]	-0.004 (0.004) [0.016]	-0.026 (0.020) [0.049]	-0.005 (0.008) [0.023]
Board membership	-0.014*** (0.004) [0.008]	-0.007 (0.004) [0.005]	-0.008 (0.010) [0.010]	-0.016 (0.010) [0.010]
Employed by the firm	-0.11*** (0.012) [0.12]	-0.043*** (0.011) [0.049]	-0.060 (0.046) [0.14]	0.006 (0.017) [0.058]
<i>B. Five years after succession</i>				
Log total income	-0.26*** (0.019) [10.1]	-0.22*** (0.024) [9.94]	-0.28*** (0.059) [10.2]	-0.24*** (0.039) [10.0]
Log total income if employed	-0.29*** (0.020) [10.4]	-0.28*** (0.026) [10.3]	-0.28*** (0.059) [10.4]	-0.23*** (0.042) [10.3]
Managerial position	-0.072*** (0.007) [0.064]	-0.036*** (0.007) [0.038]	-0.071** (0.025) [0.072]	-0.051*** (0.011) [0.044]
Owens any shares	-0.061*** (0.006) [0.074]	-0.023*** (0.005) [0.030]	-0.077** (0.024) [0.12]	-0.023* (0.009) [0.055]
Board membership	-0.077*** (0.006) [0.056]	-0.028*** (0.006) [0.024]	-0.066* (0.028) [0.078]	-0.040*** (0.012) [0.042]
Employed by the firm	-0.074*** (0.007) [0.082]	-0.022*** (0.005) [0.030]	-0.050 (0.028) [0.099]	-0.020 (0.011) [0.045]

Notes: This table shows the coefficient on Daughters (relative to brothers) in equation 2. The specification includes parent fixed effects and is estimated on a sample of parents who have both daughters and sons. Each coefficient comes from a different regression, for different combinations of outcomes and whether the firm of the exiting CEO parent (mother or father) was in a male- or female-dominated industry. Square brackets indicate the mean of the dependent variable. ‘Owens any shares’, ‘Board membership’ and ‘Employed by the firm’ refer to the firm of the exiting CEO. Standard errors clustered at the parent level. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

A Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: The Retirement Patterns of Entrepreneurs




Notes: This figure tracks the labor market status of individuals recorded as self-employed at age 57 at some point between 2001 and 2009.

Figure A2: Number of Births by Gender in Finland, 1960-2022




Notes: This figure shows the number of births by gender in Finland, 1960-2022. Data from Statistics Finland, StatFin database tables on population and society, <https://stat.fi/en/topic/population-and-society>

Figure A3: Fraction of Boys and Girls out of Newborns, 1960-2022




Notes: This figure shows the ratio of boys and girls as a fraction of all newborns. Data comes from Statistics Finland, StatFin database tables on population and society, <https://stat.fi/en/topic/population-and-society>


Figure A4: Human Capital and Succession Decisions, CEOs in Non-family Owned Firms and their Offspring



(A) Child has same field of study as the CEO parent




(B) Child has worked in the same firm as the CEO parent




(C) Child of departing CEO becomes CEO

Notes: Scatterplots display the coefficient on daughters (relative to brothers) in equation 2. Sample is restricted to 2007-2016, when information on shareholders is available, and further restricted to firms which are not majority owned by the family of the exiting CEO. Regressions are conducted separately by the modal two-digit industry of employment of the parent for field of study and same firm experience regressions, and the industry of the firm from which the parent CEO exits for succession outcomes (panel C). AGR: Agriculture, FOR: Forestry + manufacturing of wood and wood products, LMFT: Light manufacturing, PUB: Publishing, HMFT: Heavy manufacturing, UTI: Utilities, CON: Construction and mining, REP: Repairs of motor vehicles, WHO: Wholesale trade, RET: Retail trade, HOT: Hotels and restaurants, TRA: Transportation, FIN: Financial intermediation, REA: Real estate activities, ITC: Information technology and communication, OBA: Other business activities + research, EDU: Education, HLT: Health and social work, CUL: Cultural activities etc.


Figure A5: Human Capital and Succession decisions,
Retiring Entrepreneurs and their Offspring



(A) Child has same field of study as the entrepreneur parent




(B) Child has worked in the same firm as the entrepreneur parent




(C) Child of exiting entrepreneur becomes CEO

Notes: Scatterplots display the coefficient on daughters (relative to brothers) in equation 2. Sample is restricted to entrepreneurs aged 57 between 2001 and 2009. Regressions are conducted separately by the modal two-digit industry of employment of the parent for field of study and same firm experience regressions, and the industry of the firm from which the parent CEO exits for succession outcomes (panel C). AGR: Agriculture, FOR: Forestry + manufacturing of wood and wood products, LMFT: Light manufacturing, PUB: Publishing, HMFT: Heavy manufacturing, UTI: Utilities, CON: Construction and mining, REP: Repairs of motor vehicles, WHO: Wholesale trade, RET: Retail trade, HOT: Hotels and restaurants, TRA: Transportation, FIN: Financial intermediation, REA: Real estate activities, ITC: Information technology and communication, OBA: Other business activities + research, EDU: Education, HLT: Health and social work, CUL: Cultural activities etc.

Figure A6: Changes in the Incomes of Daughters and Sons of Exiting CEOs in Family Businesses around the Succession Event




(A) Daughters



(B) Sons

Notes: Figures plot the total earnings of sons and daughters of entrepreneurs relative to the year prior to the succession event.

Figure A7: Evolution of Firm Revenue by Type of Succession, Family Firms (II)



Notes: This figure plots the change in log revenue for firms where the family of the exiting CEO holds the majority of shares, 2007-2019. This graph plots the log of firm revenue around the time of the event:

$Y_{it} = \sum_{\ell \in (-4, \dots, 5)} \beta_{\ell} D_{i,t}^{\ell} + \varepsilon_{it}$. Coefficients normalized to T-5 years before the succession year. The 'Other family CEO' category includes spouses, siblings, parents and children-in-law.

Table A1: Firms with Observed Successions, Summary Statistics

	Entrepreneurs 57 Natural person	Entrepreneurs 57 LLC	Entrepreneurs 57 Partnerships etc.	CEOs, all	CEOs, non-family businesses	CEOs, family businesses
<i>Mean / [Median] / (s.e. Mean)</i>						
Revenue	151.05 [67.34] (527.94)	786.22 [265.73] (2,321.12)	351.12 [170.77] (756.05)	20,193.04 [843.65] (339,981.2)	26,312.89 [1,139.99] (382,315.1)	2,014.97 [530.02] (8,247.32)
Assets	69.88 [26.36] (193.63)	507.34 [175.53] (1,902.86)	161.64 [69.46] (682.70)	25,472.51 [752.83] (352,314.8)	33,940.65 [1,325.04] (431,590.6)	1,750.53 [321.89] (21,407.85)
Number of employees	1.10 [.9] (1.66)	4.18 [2] (7.35)	2.27 [1.4] (2.92)	54.09 [5.5] (362.59)	68.63 [7] (399.63)	9.87 [3.8] (28.36)
Observations	21,536	7,242	4,959	27,398	14,468	5,265

Notes: Values in thousands of 2022 euros for revenue and assets shown for year T-4 before the succession year. ‘Entrepreneurs 57’ denotes the sample of individuals observed as self-employed at age 57 between 2001 and 2009, whom we track into retirement. ‘Natural person’ refers to sole proprietorships, LLC stands for ‘Limited liability companies’, and ‘Partnerships etc.’ for entrepreneurs whose firm is registered as a partnership or under other legal forms.

Table A2: Entrepreneur Successions (All Observed), Summary Statistics

		Proportion of incoming CEOs who are a:			
	Obs.	Family member	Child	Son	Daughter
A. CEO transitions, 1994-2019, by departing CEO age:					
20-29	4,192	0.220			
30-39	16,939	0.128	<0.001	<0.001	0
40-49	27,567	0.089	0.009	0.007	0.002
50-59	27,463	0.132	0.070	0.059	0.012
60-69	16,671	0.231	0.184	0.147	0.037
70+	2,347	0.477	0.399	0.306	0.092
All	95,210	0.184	0.174	0.136	0.038
B. CEO transitions, firms without family majority ownership, 2007-2019, by departing CEO age:					
20-29	1,541	0.138			
30-39	6,682	0.081			
40-49	12,150	0.051	0.004	0.003	0.001
50-59	12,585	0.059	0.024	0.019	0.005
60-69	9,098	0.109	0.083	0.066	0.016
70+	1,074	0.339	0.280	0.212	0.066
All	43,130	0.110	0.110	0.084	0.025
C. CEO transitions, family owned firms, 2007-2019, by departing CEO age:					
20-29	524	0.365			
30-39	2,047	0.334			
40-49	2,550	0.324	0.026	0.021	0.005
50-59	2,990	0.457	0.246	0.207	0.039
60-69	3,373	0.556	0.446	0.354	0.092
70+	777	0.692	0.577	0.449	0.126
All	12,262	0.475	0.404	0.320	0.084
D. Entrepreneurs (age 57)	47,619	0.117	0.059	0.045	0.014

Notes: The table displays summary statistics for all observed CEO successions or retirement decision (as of 2019). Family members include the CEO's parents, spouses, siblings, children and children-in-law. Panel D shows results for a sample of individuals recorded as self-employed at age 57 without an explicit CEO role but linked (employed) to a specific firm in administrative data. In their case, columns 3-6 indicate whether a family member/child/son/daughter are working for the same firm after the parent is no longer working for the firm.

Table A3: Information About Old and New CEOs at Succession,
Summary Statistics, Non-Family Businesses

	Professional	Sons	Daughters	Other
<i>Mean /(s.e. Mean)</i>				
Tenure of the exiting CEO	5.407 (0.023)	10.073 (0.185)	9.502 (0.321)	6.345 (0.115)
CEO died	0.009 (0.000)	0.074 (0.008)	0.154 (0.021)	0.032 (0.004)
CEO retired	0.054 (0.001)	0.411 (0.015)	0.472 (0.029)	0.078 (0.006)
Age of exiting CEO	48.785 (0.054)	63.124 (0.239)	63.157 (0.493)	44.063 (0.274)
Age of new CEO	44.322 (0.048)	34.669 (0.245)	35.147 (0.523)	46.724 (0.266)
Years of schooling new CEO	15.194 (0.010)	13.961 (0.068)	14.640 (0.127)	14.314 (0.052)
College degree new CEO	0.600 (0.002)	0.458 (0.015)	0.572 (0.029)	0.487 (0.011)
Any previous experience in the firm	0.334 (0.002)	0.564 (0.015)	0.465 (0.029)	0.452 (0.011)
Any previous managerial experience	0.639 (0.002)	0.387 (0.015)	0.351 (0.028)	0.482 (0.011)
Any outside experience	0.982 (0.001)	0.913 (0.008)	0.946 (0.013)	0.973 (0.004)
Observations	39,667	1,102	299	2,074

Notes: This table summarizes some of the circumstances surrounding the CEO succession process. The four categories in the columns indicate mutually exclusive and exhaustive types of incoming CEOs. The excluded category for the previous CEO exit consists of cases where the exiting CEO did not die (row 2) or retired (row 3). Column 2 shows averages in cases where a professional (unrelated) CEO takes over, while columns 3-5 correspond to sons, daughters and other family members of the exiting CEO taking over. The sample is restricted to non-family firms (the family of the exiting CEO does not hold the majority of shares), for years 2007-2019, when shareholding information is available.

Table A4: Effect of Firstborn Daughter on Firm Outcomes,
Four Years Before Succession Year

	Ln Turnover	Ln Assets	Ln Empl.	Ln Wages	Obs.
A. Entrepreneurs age 57					
Firstborn daughter	-0.035 (0.023) [12.4]	-0.038 (0.027) [11.7]	-0.038* (0.018) [0.72]	-0.070* (0.033) [10.5]	10,373
B. CEOs, all					
Firstborn daughter	0.022 (0.029) [14.1]	0.039 (0.032) [13.7]	0.040 (0.026) [1.96]	0.043 (0.030) [12.4]	18,965
C. CEOs, family own.					
Firstborn daughter	0.065 (0.044) [13.3]	0.060 (0.048) [12.8]	0.047 (0.038) [1.44]	0.060 (0.047) [11.8]	4,080
D. CEOs, non-family own.					
Firstborn daughter	-0.011 (0.049) [14.5]	0.006 (0.052) [14.3]	0.044 (0.046) [2.18]	0.053 (0.053) [12.7]	7,373
Mean					

Notes: This table shows the association between having a firstborn daughter and firm outcomes, four years before the year of succession. For entrepreneurs who retire after age 57, the succession year is defined as the last year they appear employed in the firm, while for CEOs succession is identified from administrative data. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression. Regressions include controls for total number of children. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table A5: Fertility Effect of Female Firstborn, by Parent's Industry

	Employees	Entrepreneurs
Agriculture + hunting + forestry + fishing	0.039 (0.024) [11,084]	0.087*** (0.016) [35,478]
Mining and construction	0.038** (0.013) [33,597]	0.060** (0.022) [16,057]
Manufacturing	0.020*** (0.006) [137,499]	0.052** (0.017) [22,029]
Electricity gas and water supply	0.040 (0.021) [8,759]	0.026 (0.095) [444]
Wholesale and retail trade + repair of vehicles and goods	0.028*** (0.008) [64,179]	0.037* (0.015) [25,378]
Hotels and restaurants	0.030 (0.015) [14,343]	0.042 (0.029) [5,249]
Transport, storage and communication	0.022* (0.010) [42,687]	0.015 (0.022) [11,189]
Financial intermediation + real estate	0.028*** (0.007) [85,085]	0.021 (0.016) [22,501]
Public administration and defence	0.024** (0.009) [56,785]	0.043 (0.045) [2,486]
Education + Health + Social work	0.021*** (0.004) [230,468]	0.030* (0.013) [32,111]

Notes: This table shows the coefficient β in equation 1, estimated separately for subsamples of employees and self-employed individuals (labeled 'Entrepreneurs') in various industries. Square brackets indicate the number of employees or entrepreneurs in each industry. Regressions include controls for parental age, gender, income, place of residence and education. Robust standard errors in parantheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table A6: Parents' Separation, Five Years After the Birth of the First Child

	Effect of first born daughter	Obs.
Employees	0.004*** (0.001)	770,588
Tercile 1 Entrepreneurs	0.001 (0.003)	64,387
Tercile 2 Entrepreneurs	0.009*** (0.003)	63,041
Tercile 3 Entrepreneurs	0.008*** (0.002)	63,078
Entrepreneurs 57 sample	0.008*** (0.002)	47,535
CEOs	0.001 (0.004)	26,859

Notes: This table shows the coefficient β in equation 1. Outcome is a binary variable indicating the parents are no longer cohabiting, five years after the birth of their first child. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table A7: Summary Statistics, Adoptions

	All parents	Male adoptive parent in:		Female adoptive parent in:	
		MD industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
<i>Mean/C.I./ Observations</i>					
Employees	0.493 [0.484; 0.497] 22,028	0.484 [0.471; 0.495] 6,743	0.508 [0.493; 0.523] 4,397	0.481 [0.464; 0.498] 3,245	0.491 [0.480; 0.502] 7,643
Entrepreneurs	0.470 [0.454; 0.486] 3,698	0.457 [0.434; 0.481] 1,717	0.489 [0.451; 0.527] 654	0.456 [0.418; 0.495] 633	0.497 [0.460; 0.534] 694
CEOs	0.517 [0.483; 0.551] 824	0.487 [0.439; 0.535] 423	0.494 [0.434; 0.554] 269	0.675 [0.523; 0.827] 40	0.652 [0.553; 0.751] 92

Notes: Administrative data from 2019 on all adopted children and parents.

Table A8: Years of Work Experience in the Same Industry as the Parent,
Within - Family Estimates, Coefficient on Daughters

	Father in:		Mother in:	
	MD ^a industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
Employees	-1.51*** (0.019) [2.37]	-0.23*** (0.011) [0.74]	-0.97*** (0.033) [2.70]	0.027** (0.009) [0.67]
Entrepreneurs	-1.58*** (0.033) [2.40]	-0.65*** (0.060) [2.23]	-0.54*** (0.060) [1.90]	0.27*** (0.053) [1.35]
CEOs, all	-1.24*** (0.044) [2.38]	-0.35*** (0.035) [1.29]	-0.52*** (0.120) [1.80]	0.092 (0.063) [1.12]
CEOs, non-family own.	-0.69*** (0.049) [1.67]	-0.26*** (0.041) [1.19]	-0.30* (0.12) [1.24]	0.038 (0.076) [0.98]
CEOs, family own.	-2.12*** (0.096) [3.48]	-0.59*** (0.071) [1.55]	-0.89*** (0.25) [2.68]	0.20 (0.11) [1.34]

Notes: Work experience is measured as the number of years when the child appears employed either in the same firm as the parent, or in the same industry as the parent. Administrative data is available after 1987. This results in practice in censoring of joint experience spells for older children, who started working before 1987. Square brackets indicate the average for sons. Regressions include child age fixed effects and parent fixed effects. Entrepreneurs denote to the sample of entrepreneurs that were 57 years old between 2001 and 2009. Work experience of children measured one year before firm succession or parent retirement. Standard errors clustered at the parent level in parentheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table A9: Age of Child's First Employment,
Within-Family Estimates, Coefficient on Daughters

	Father		Mother	
	MD ^a industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
Employees	-0.007 (0.012) [20.4]	-0.084* (0.039) [20.5]	0.033 (0.018) [20.2]	-0.022* (0.009) [20.6]
Tercile 1 Entrepreneurs	0.11** (0.037) [20.0]	-0.084* (0.039) [20.5]	0.26*** (0.058) [19.9]	0.056 (0.029) [20.4]
Tercile 2 Entrepreneurs	0.30*** (0.030) [20.0]	-0.23*** (0.049) [20.4]	0.48*** (0.040) [20.1]	0.086* (0.037) [20.2]
Tercile 3 Entrepreneurs	0.29*** (0.025) [20.2]	-0.27*** (0.060) [20.5]	0.32*** (0.040) [20.4]	-0.095 (0.049) [20.4]
CEOs, all	0.040 (0.047) [20.0]	-0.34*** (0.054) [20.5]	0.10 (0.15) [19.8]	-0.30*** (0.084) [20.2]
CEOs, non-family own.	-0.27** (0.071) [20.3]	-0.39*** (0.079) [20.6]	-0.27 (0.25) [20.1]	-0.45*** (0.13) [20.3]
CEOs, family own.	0.55*** (0.088) [19.2]	0.23 (0.15) [19.8]	0.37 (0.28) [19.2]	-0.21 (0.18) [19.9]

Notes: a. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the industry. Square brackets indicate the average outcome for sons. Only children that are at least 25 years old are included. Employees category denotes individuals who have never been self-employed. Entrepreneurs are allocated to terciles depending on how many years they have been registered as self-employed between 1995 and 2019. Regressions include controls for parental age, gender, income, place of residence and education. Standard errors clustered at the parent level in parentheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table A10: Years of Schooling, Within-Family Estimates, Coefficient on Daughters

	Father		Mother	
	MD ^a	FD	MD	FD
Employees	0.74*** (0.011) [13.6]	0.70*** (0.013) [13.9]	0.73*** (0.015) [13.5]	0.74*** (0.007) [13.7]
Tercile 1 Entrepreneurs	0.81*** (0.035) [13.5]	0.68*** (0.036) [13.6]	0.80*** (0.053) [13.5]	0.76*** (0.025) [13.6]
Tercile 2 Entrepreneurs	1.00*** (0.028) [13.5]	0.73*** (0.047) [13.9]	1.13*** (0.031) [13.5]	0.72*** (0.035) [13.7]
Tercile 3 Entrepreneurs	0.98*** (0.023) [13.6]	0.77*** (0.058) [14.2]	0.96*** (0.035) [13.7]	0.79*** (0.046) [13.9]
CEOs, all	0.74*** (0.044) [14.3]	0.67*** (0.052) [14.6]	0.82*** (0.14) [14.0]	0.78*** (0.083) [14.2]
CEOs, non-family own.	0.66*** (0.067) [14.6]	0.69*** (0.077) [14.7]	0.57* (0.25) [14.1]	0.69*** (0.13) [14.3]
CEOs, family own.	0.91*** (0.087) [13.9]	0.60*** (0.15) [14.3]	1.27*** (0.28) [13.7]	0.97*** (0.17) [14.1]

Notes: Square brackets indicate the average for sons. Only children that are at least 30 years old are included. Employees category denotes individuals who have never been self-employed. Entrepreneurs are allocated to terciles depending on how many years they have been registered as self-employed between 1995 and 2019. CEO information is based on Finnish board data (PRH_BOARD), years 1994-2019, and firm ownership data (FLOWN_OWNER), years 2006-2019. Regressions include controls for parental age, gender, income, place of residence and education. Standard errors clustered at the parent level in parentheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table A11: Any Same Firm Experience with the Parent,
Within-Family Estimates, Son-Bias Interactions

	Father		Mother	
	MD ^a	FD	MD	FD
Employees				
Daughter	-0.11*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.085*** (0.002)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.015* (0.007)	0.002 (0.003)
Entrepreneurs (age 57 and above)				
Daughter	-0.17*** (0.004)	-0.067*** (0.008)	-0.062*** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.007)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.025** (0.008)	0.008 (0.016)	-0.025 (0.015)	0.011 (0.014)
CEOs, all				
Daughter	-0.16*** (0.007)	-0.042*** (0.006)	-0.060* (0.023)	0.054*** (0.011)
Daughter x Son Bias	0.014 (0.014)	0.015 (0.011)	0.019 (0.042)	0.048* (0.020)
CEOs, non-family owned				
Daughter	-0.11*** (0.008)	-0.037** (0.006)	-0.047 (0.029)	0.061*** (0.013)
Daughter x Son Bias	0.025 (0.017)	0.027* (0.013)	0.010 (0.051)	0.025 (0.023)
CEOs, family owned				
Daughter	-0.23*** (0.011)	-0.058** (0.011)	-0.090* (0.040)	0.045* (0.020)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.036 (0.074)	0.079* (0.038)

Notes: Son bias is an indicator for individuals who had a son as their youngest child and all their other children were daughters, when they were aged 52 or above. Regressions include child age fixed effects and parent fixed effects. Work experience of children at one year before firm succession or parent retirement. Standard errors clustered at the parent level in parentheses. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A12: Same Broad Field of Study as the Parent,
Within-Family Estimates, Son-Bias Interactions

	Father		Mother	
	MD ^a	FD	MD	FD
1. Employees				
Daughter	-0.31*** (0.004)	-0.14*** (0.003)	-0.019** (0.005)	0.11*** (0.002)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.016*** (0.004)
2. Entrepreneurs (all terciles)				
Daughter	-0.28*** (0.005)	-0.13*** (0.007)	0.015* (0.006)	0.093*** (0.005)
Daughter x Son Bias	0.008 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.022* (0.011)
5. CEOs, all				
Daughter	-0.23*** (0.013)	-0.096*** (0.013)	0.021 (0.040)	0.087*** (0.022)
Daughter x Son Bias	0.013 (0.027)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.074)	-0.047 (0.043)
6. CEOs, non-family owned				
Daughter	-0.18*** (0.018)	-0.098*** (0.019)	0.039 (0.067)	0.066 (0.034)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.007 (0.039)	-0.003 (0.041)	-0.090 (0.12)	-0.008 (0.066)
7. CEOs, family owned				
Daughter	-0.33*** (0.026)	-0.13*** (0.034)	0.068 (0.066)	0.13** (0.049)
Daughter x Son Bias	0.093 (0.054)	-0.057 (0.079)	-0.005 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.10)

Notes: a. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the industry. Employees category denotes individuals who have never been self-employed. Entrepreneurs (who reached the age of 57 between 2001-2009) are allocated to terciles depending on how many years they have been registered as self-employed between 1995 and 2019. CEO information is based on Finnish board data (PRH_BOARD) and firm ownership data (FLOWN_OWNER), years 2006-2019. Son bias is an indicator for individuals who had a son as their youngest child and all their other children were daughters, when they were aged 52 or above. Standard errors clustered at the parent level in parentheses. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A13: Differences between Daughters and Sons in Human Capital Accumulation, Families with only Daughters or only Sons

	Father in:		Mother in:	
	MD ^a industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
A. Same field of study as parent				
Employees	-0.30*** (0.003) [0.39]	-0.14*** (0.003) [0.28]	-0.014** (0.004) [0.20]	0.082*** (0.002) [0.13]
Entrepreneurs	-0.27*** (0.005) [0.38]	-0.12*** (0.008) [0.28]	0.019* (0.008) [0.17]	0.065*** (0.005) [0.15]
CEOs, all	-0.21*** (0.012) [0.35]	-0.069*** (0.016) [0.26]	0.083** (0.029) [0.19]	0.032 (0.021) [0.16]
CEOs, non-family firms	-0.18*** (0.017) [0.33]	-0.067*** (0.025) [0.27]	0.066* (0.044) [0.20]	0.032 (0.036) [0.17]
CEOs, family firms	-0.33*** (0.026) [0.42]	-0.11** (0.043) [0.31]	0.010 (0.062) [0.18]	0.022 (0.047) [0.19]
B. Any joint (same firm) experience with parent				
Employees	-0.10*** (0.002) [0.17]	-0.019*** (0.002) [0.088]	-0.003 (0.004) [0.17]	0.079*** (0.002) [0.081]
Entrepreneurs	-0.16*** (0.005) [0.24]	-0.055*** (0.011) [0.20]	-0.043*** (0.011) [0.18]	0.052*** (0.008) [0.12]
CEOs, all	-0.096*** (0.007) [0.27]	-0.062*** (0.01) [0.22]	0.008 (0.015) [0.18]	-0.004 (0.015) [0.19]
CEOs, non-family firms	-0.068*** (0.008) [0.23]	-0.019 (0.012) [0.18]	0.017 (0.017) [0.16]	0.015 (0.019) [0.14]
CEOs, family firms	-0.22*** (0.020) [0.49]	-0.17*** (0.030) [0.43]	-0.009 (0.052) [0.36]	-0.059 (0.038) [0.37]

Notes: This table show the coefficient on Daughters in equation 2 estimated without parental fixed effects, using a sample of families that have only daughters or only sons. The sample is further restricted to children above age 30. Each coefficient comes from a different regression, for different combinations of outcomes and whether the firm of the parent was in a male- or female-dominated industry. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the industry. Square brackets indicate the average outcome for sons. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A14: Differences between Daughters and Sons in Board Membership and Share Ownership, Families with only Daughters or only Sons

	Father		Mother	
	MD industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
A. Child of CEO ever on the board before succession				
1. CEOs, all	-0.030*** (0.002) [0.029]	-0.027*** (0.003) [0.026]	-0.024*** (0.004) [0.034]	-0.014* (0.007) [0.049]
2. CEOs, non-family owned firms	-0.018*** (0.002) [0.019]	-0.017*** (0.004) [0.016]	-0.009* (0.004) [0.017]	-0.014 (0.009) [0.026]
3. CEOs, family owned firms	-0.055*** (0.006) [0.066]	-0.059*** (0.011) [0.066]	-0.058*** (0.015) [0.067]	-0.009 (0.017) [0.073]
B. Child of exiting CEO ever held shares in the firm before succession				
1. CEOs, all	-0.047*** (0.002) [0.058]	-0.035*** (0.005) [0.067]	-0.019*** (0.005) [0.059]	0.019 (0.011) [0.107]
2. CEOs, non-family owned firms	-0.013*** (0.001) [0.027]	-0.011** (0.004) [0.026]	-0.005 (0.004) [0.024]	0.001 (0.001) [0.050]
3. CEOs, family owned firms	-0.150*** (0.007) [0.186]	-0.085*** (0.013) [0.157]	-0.068*** (0.019) [0.195]	0.028 (0.018) [0.165]

Notes: This table show the coefficient on Daughters in equation 2, estimated without parent fixed effects, for a sample of families with only daughters or only sons. Each coefficient comes from a different regression, for different combinations of outcomes and whether the firm of the parent was in a male- or female-dominated industry. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified examining if the industry where the firm operates had more male or female employees in the transfer year. Square brackets indicate the mean of the dependent variable. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Table A15: Effect of First-Born Daughter on the Succession Outcome, Son-Bias Interactions

	Father		Mother	
	MD ^a industry	FD industry	MD industry	FD industry
A. CEOs, all firms				
Daughter	-0.099*** (0.006)	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.059*** (0.016)	-0.012 (0.018)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.039** (0.013)	-0.008 (0.016)	0.003 (0.030)	-0.018 (0.034)
B. CEOs, family firms				
Daughter	-0.273*** (0.019)	-0.123*** (0.032)	-0.104* (0.050)	0.027 (0.050)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.156*** (0.043)	-0.036 (0.070)	-0.046 (0.108)	-0.091 (0.081)
C. CEOs, non-family owned firms				
Daughter	-0.057*** (0.006)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.055 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.019)
Daughter x Son Bias	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.033)	0.020 (0.031)
D. Entrepreneurs (age 57 and above)				
Daughter	-0.124*** (0.004)	-0.053*** (0.007)	-0.072*** (0.008)	0.016* (0.007)
Daughter X Son bias	-0.026** (0.008)	0.0134 (0.015)	-0.0231 (0.016)	0.0128 (0.012)

Notes: a. MD and FD indicate male and respectively female dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the industry. Son bias is an indicator for individuals who had a son as their youngest child and all their other children were daughters, when they were aged 52 or above. Regressions include parent fixed effects and child age fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the parent level in parentheses. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A16: Differences between Daughters and Sons in Succeeding the Exiting CEO,
Families with only Daughters or only Sons

	Father		Mother	
	MD Industry	FD Industry	MD Industry	FD Industry
A. Child of departing CEO becomes CEO, all				
Daughter	-0.071*** (0.006) [0.051]	-0.039** (0.007) [0.037]	-0.030* (0.013) [0.061]	-0.037** (0.014) [0.056]
Obs.	6,483	2,517	1,7344	1,038
A1. Child of departing CEO becomes CEO, non-family businesses				
Daughter	-0.027*** (0.004) [0.024]	-0.022*** (0.005) [0.015]	-0.030** (0.011) [0.034]	-0.013 (0.012) [0.034]
Obs.	4,817	2,012	950	710
A2. Child of departing CEO becomes CEO, family businesses				
Daughter	-0.169*** (0.016) [0.170]	-0.099*** (0.027) [0.127]	-0.035 (0.034) [0.127]	-0.069 (0.036) [0.0104]
Obs.	1,666	505	394	328
B. Firm links to child after parent retires, self-employed sample				
Daughter	-0.085*** (0.004) [0.065]	-0.033*** (0.007) [0.063]	-0.065*** (0.009) [0.079]	0.022*** (0.005) [0.048]
Obs.	16,030	4,681	3,526	7,260
B1. Firm links to child after parent retires, sole proprietorship				
Daughter	-0.048*** (0.004) [0.035]	-0.025*** (0.007) [0.029]	-0.014 (0.013) [0.034]	0.020*** (0.004) [0.021]
Obs.	7,145	2,083	900	4,798
B2. Firm links to child after parent retires, limited liability companies				
Daughter	-0.175*** (0.013) [0.153]	-0.057*** (0.016) [0.101]	-0.131*** (0.029) [0.183]	0.010 (0.022) [0.129]
Obs.	2,995	1,356	731	917
B3. Firm links to child after parent retires, partnerships and others				
Daughter	-0.184*** (0.014) [0.119]	-0.023 (0.019) [0.098]	-0.122** (0.040) [0.157]	0.053** (0.019) [0.111]
Obs.	1,771	963	338	1078

Notes: This table show the coefficient on Daughters in equation 2, estimated without parent fixed effects, for a sample of families with only daughters or only sons. Each coefficient comes from a different regression, for different combinations of outcomes and whether the firm of the parent was in a male- or female-dominated industry. MD and FD indicate male- and female-dominated industries, identified using the modal gender of employees in the exiting CEO's industry. Square brackets indicate the mean of the dependent variable. Regressions include parent fixed effects and child age fixed effects. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A17: Fraction of Incoming CEOs who had any Experience in the Firm,
by the Type of Previous CEO Exit, Family Firms

	Previous CEO died	Previous CEO retired	CEO exit other than retirement or death
<i>Mean(s.e.)</i>			
Type of incoming CEO:			
Sons	0.542 (0.034)	0.525 (0.017)	0.737 (0.012)
Daughters	0.287 (0.053)	0.4 (0.031)	0.656 (0.029)
Other family	0.346 (0.095)	0.418 (0.076)	0.52 (0.019)
Unrelated (professional)	0.324 (0.035)	0.182 (0.013)	0.334 (0.006)
Obs.	656	2,147	9,459
Obs. as % of total obs.	5.35 %	17.51 %	77.14 %

Notes: This table shows a cross-tabulation of the likelihood that the incoming CEO had any experience in the firm, by the circumstances of the previous CEO exit and the type of incoming CEO.

Table A18: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Professional Versus Family Transition
(Family Owned Businesses)

		Differences around CEO successions:					
	First stage	Ln revenue	Ln assets	Ln employees	Ln wages	OROA	OROA, ind. adj.
A. Family vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Family CEO	-	-0.069**	-0.016	-0.051**	-0.074**	0.38	0.18
	-	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.36)	(0.39)
2. Median regression							
Family CEO	-	-0.006	0.006	-0.019	-0.004	0.017**	0.065
	-	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.075)
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.092***	0.38	0.68**	0.32	0.44	-3.46	-3.67
	(0.015)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(3.64)	(3.98)
F	36.4						
Mean		-0.006	0.048	-0.019	0.027	-0.26	-0.60
Median		0.020	0.042	0.008	0.027	-0.028	-0.17
N	4,317	4,317	4,317	4,317	4,317	4,317	4,317
B. Child vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Child CEO	-	-0.007	0.022	-0.017	-0.019	0.42	0.16
	-	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.37)	(0.40)
2. Median regression							
Child CEO	-	0.019	0.028	0.002	0.015	0.017**	0.051
	-	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.080)
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.13***	0.26	0.52**	0.11	0.22	-2.96	-2.98
	(0.016)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(3.01)	(3.25)
F	64.7						
Mean		0.027	0.066	-0.000	0.057	-0.27	-0.62
Median		0.031	0.054	0.020	0.064	-0.028	-0.17
N	3,714	3,714	3,714	3,714	3,714	3,714	3,714
C. Other family vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Other family CEO		-0.23***	-0.12**	-0.14***	-0.22***	0.25	0.19
		(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.34)	(0.42)
2. Median regression							
Other family CEO		-0.087***	-0.081**	-0.068**	-0.070**	0.011	-0.033
		(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.008)	(0.14)
3. IV, first born daughter	0.010	-3.20	-6.99	-4.20	-4.36	54.7	71.2
	(0.016)	(5.69)	(11.5)	(7.00)	(7.47)	(104.5)	(129.4)
F	0.38						
Mean		-0.022	0.029	-0.025	0.015	-0.39	-0.64
Median		0.008	0.016	0	0.041	-0.035	-0.18
N	2,716	2,716	2,716	2,716	2,716	2,716	2,716

Notes: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates in equation (5), along with the first stage and 2SLS estimates associated with using an indicator for the gender of the first born child as an instrument for the FamilyCEO variable. The sample includes all family owned firms with explicit CEO roles which underwent a succession between 2002 and 2016. The firm is classified as family owned if the family of the exiting CEO owns at least 50% of the shares. The outcome variable indicates the difference between average firm outcomes in the three years after succession and three years before the succession year. Regressions include controls for the year of the transition. Robust standard errors in parantheses. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A19: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Professional Versus Family Transition
(Non-Family Owned Businesses)

		Differences around CEO successions:					
	First stage	Ln revenue	Ln assets	Ln employees	Ln wages	OROA	OROA, ind. adj.
A. Family vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Family CEO	-	-0.090***	0.010	-0.026	0.010	-0.023	0.38
	-	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.097)	(0.20)
2. Median regression							
Family CEO	-	-0.007	0.040*	0.003	0.014	-0.016*	-0.055
	-	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.078)
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.015*	-3.40	-0.34	-1.38	-1.76	-4.20	3.24
	(0.006)	(1.90)	(1.05)	(1.18)	(1.47)	(11.2)	(13.9)
F	5.96						
Mean		0.000	0.047	-0.027	0.005	-0.070	-0.57
Median		0.010	0.006	-0.007	0.029	-0.014	-0.13
N	9,176	9,176	9,176	9,176	9,176	9,176	9,176
B. Child vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Child CEO	-	-0.039	0.022	0.001	0.047	0.030	0.53*
	-	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.090)	(0.22)
2. Median regression							
Child CEO	-	-0.007	0.045*	0.012	0.028	-0.011	-0.042
	-	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.10)
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.026***	-1.93*	-0.22	-0.83	-0.95	-2.85	1.22
	(0.005)	(0.84)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.75)	(6.44)	(8.03)
F	26.73						
Mean		0.006	0.047	-0.025	0.007	-0.065	-0.57
Median		0.010	0.006	-0.006	0.030	-0.014	-0.13
N	8,884	8,884	8,884	8,884	8,884	8,884	8,884
C. Other family vs. professional CEO							
1. OLS							
Other family CEO		-0.18**	-0.011	-0.077	-0.059	-0.12	0.10
		(0.066)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.063)	(0.13)	(0.36)
2. Median regression							
Other family CEO		-0.011	0.001	-0.054	-0.046	-0.027*	-0.083
		(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.011)	(0.11)
3. IV, first born daughter	0.011**	4.70	0.056	2.03	2.68	5.90	-1.06
	(0.004)	(2.58)	(1.46)	(1.65)	(2.05)	(16.0)	(19.2)
F	7.67						
Mean		0.002	0.046	-0.027	0.002	-0.071	-0.60
Median		0.011	0.003	-0.009	0.028	-0.014	-0.13
N	8,644	8,644	8,644	8,644	8,644	8,644	8,644

Notes: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates in equation (5), along with the first stage and 2SLS estimates associated with using an indicator for the gender of the first born child as an instrument for the FamilyCEO variable. The sample includes all non-family owned firms with explicit CEO roles which underwent a succession between 2002 and 2016. The firm is classified as non-family owned if the family of the exiting CEO owns less than 50% of the shares. The outcome variable indicates the difference between average firm outcomes in the three years after succession and three years before the succession year. Regressions include controls for the year of the transition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A20: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Professional Versus Offspring Transition
(Sample of Entrepreneurs at Age 57)

		Differences around successions:						
		First stage	Ln turnover	Ln assets	Ln employees	Ln wages	OROA	OROA, ind. adj.
A. <i>Family vs. professional</i>								
1. OLS								
Family continues activity	-	0.18***	0.13***	0.14***	0.21***	12.2	12.2	
	-	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(10.5)	(10.5)	
2. Median regression								
Family continues activity	-	0.099***	0.057***	0.099***	0.16***	0.002	-0.039	
	-	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.062)	
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.066***	0.57*	0.14	0.32	0.47	-92.4	-95.0	
	(0.013)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.19)	(0.32)	(153.9)	(154.0)	
F	25.49							
Mean		-0.29	-0.17	-0.26	-0.21	3.14	2.34	
Median		-0.15	-0.093	-0.19	-0.12	-0.027	-0.79	
N		5,740	5,740	5,740	5,740	5,740	5,740	
B. <i>Child vs. professional</i>								
1. OLS								
Child continues activity	-	0.24***	0.15***	0.17***	0.26***	15.6	15.5	
	-	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.021)	13.9	13.9	
2. Median regression								
Child continues activity	-	0.12***	0.079***	0.13***	0.20***	0.007	-0.009	
	-	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.067)	
3. IV, first born daughter	-0.083***	0.37	0.026	0.23	0.23	-83.2	-84.8	
	(0.014)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(137.9)	(137.9)	
F	36.8							
Mean		-0.28	-0.17	-0.26	-0.20	3.56	2.76	
Median		-0.14	-0.088	-0.18	-0.11	-0.025	-0.75	
N		5,058	5,058	5,058	5,058	5,058	5,058	

Notes: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates in equation (5), along with the first stage and 2SLS estimates associated with using an indicator for the gender of the first born child as an instrument for the FamilyCEO variable. The outcome variable indicates the difference between average firm outcomes in the three years after succession and three years before the succession year. Regressions include controls for the year of the transition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.

Table A21: Effect of Succession on Children's Outcomes:
Difference-in-Differences Estimates

	CEO successions in		
	All firms	Non-family firms	Family firms
A. Log of total income			
Child becomes CEO	0.026 (0.016)	0.050 (0.035)	0.018 (0.024)
Daughter	-0.088*** (0.009)	-0.086*** (0.014)	-0.075*** (0.020)
Child becomes CEO x Daughter	0.15*** (0.038)	0.045 (0.076)	0.19*** (0.051)
B. Fraction of shares owned			
Child becomes CEO	0.21*** (0.007)	0.18*** (0.015)	0.25*** (0.010)
Daughter	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.004)
Child becomes CEO x Daughter	-0.051*** (0.015)	-0.060* (0.030)	-0.030 (0.023)
N	44,588	20,754	9,783

Notes: Regressions include controls for educational attainment, a quadratic in previous work experience and age fixed effects. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.